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THE BALKAN WARS

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THE BALKAN WARS

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THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

BY

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MAJOR, MEDICAL CORPS, U. S. A.

PRESS OF THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS

1915

Annex
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Introduction

IN ACCEPTING the burden of proof for my presumption, as a non-combatant, in addressing a body of officers of the combatant arms of the service on such a subject as "The Balkan Wars," I feel it incumbent upon me to give a brief account of my contact with the Balkan situation, covering a period of eighteen months, which afforded the opportunity for my observations.

About the 1st of July, 1912, I landed in Trieste on sick leave of absence which was later arranged to terminate with the end of the year. From this port I took passage for a tour of the Dalmatian coast, on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, stopping at Pola, the principal Austrian naval base, Sebinicio, Spalato, Ragusa, and as far south as Cattaro, at the head of the Bays of Cattaro, which form a harbor much like that of New York with the sea as far away from the port as Sandy Hook is from Castle Garden. Cattaro, while Austrian and one of the finest naval harbors in the world, is the logical port of Cetenje, the capital of Montenegro. As an automobile post-route line between Cattaro and Cetenje was discovered, I continued my journey to Cetenje and the Lake of Scutari. On returning to the northern Adriatic by the same route, I landed at Fiume, crossed by rail to Trieste and thence by sea to Venice.

In September, 1912, I went by rail from Vienna, through Buda-Pest, Belgrade, Sofia and Adrianople, to Constantinople, where I remained three weeks with my friend, Major J. R. M. Taylor, our capable and accomplished military *attaché*. There were, at that time, echoing about Constantinople large and glowing rumors of the coming war, but as one can always hear anything and everything, both true and false, anywhere in the near East, and not knowing what or whom to believe, I grew so impatient in waiting for the long-advertised and often postponed "Balkan conflagration" that I sought refuge again in the less distrustful environments of Paris, returning there by way of the Black Sea through Constanza and Bucharest.

War was actually declared between the Balkan States and Turkey on October 17, 1912. In the last days of October

the interest of the Parisian public seemed to be divided between the two great and absorbing world's events—the *debacle* of the Turkish army in Thrace, which promised the celebration of another Christian mass in the Mosque of St. Sofia, and the progress of the Becker murder trial in New York, which revealed a police conspiracy of a magnitude that threatened the security of the American Republic. My own personal interests were so unpatriotically prejudiced that on the last day of October I abandoned my own country to its destiny, completed my monthly personal report with a reputable European capital as my temporary address and, after nightfall, boarded a sleeping-car which carried me through Roumania to Constanza, whence I sailed for Constantinople to arrive November 3d, or just about the time the Turkish army began to dig itself in on the Chatalja line for the stubborn defense of Constantinople.

A local chapter of the American National Red Cross Society, formed under the presidency of the late lamented Mr. Rockhill, the American ambassador, had been at work for several weeks assembling material and collecting funds, but a field party had not been organized. Five thousand dollars had been received from the American National Red Cross Society and many times that amount had been secured from private sources at home and abroad, through the personal influence of Mr. and Mrs. Rockhill, Mr. Hoffman Philip of our Embassy, Dr. Gates of Roberts College, Dr. Patrick of Constantinople College, and other members of the American colony. I deeply regret that neither the time nor this opportunity permits further mention of that personal service which the American ambassador and ambassadress rendered in their most capable and devoted administration of the American National Red Cross Chapter in Constantinople.

On the day of my arrival I was named as chief surgeon of the Red Cross field party and began at once its organization and a search for a field of labor. After much importunity and in the face of the great obstacles of inertia in Turkish administration, we found a service in a large, crude military hospital which had just been improvised in the old military barracks of Tash Kishla, well within the European quarter of Constantinople. We assumed the professional care, administration and financial support of an operating room and two wards with a total of 120 beds and as many wounded soldiers. After about a month's service when I was due to leave Constantinople on account of the termination of my sick leave, I was placed on a duty status at the American Embassy, on the re-

quest of the American ambassador. Our service was continued six months, and we treated at Tash Kishla Hospital 500 patients with three deaths and no complete amputations. For the second two weeks of this period, in company with Mr. Hoffman Philip and the Rev. Robert Frew, a Scotch Presbyterian minister of Constantinople, I also had personal charge of our specially organized Red Cross party which assumed the professional management, subsistence and financial support of the cholera camp at San Stephano, in the suburbs of Constantinople, where we had corraled in a compound, with the aid of an efficient guard, 600 Turkish soldiers, among whom there were 400 cholera cases with 200 deaths.

During the period of the second armistice, or, in April 1913, I made two visits to the Chatalja line. On the first occasion the Sanitary Inspector General, Abdul Selim Pasha, sent me in an antomobile through the camps and sanitary stations on the right wing of the army from Heydemkeni, the rail base, to the Black Sea. When I returned, some days later I accompanied this distinguished and courteous officer on a special two-day sanitary inspection trip through all the camps and sanitary stations on the left wing, extending from the same starting point to the Sea of Marmora, and including the advanced left flank beyond Buyuk-Checkmudje.

The Second Balkan War began began July 1, 1913, and on July 11th I was able to accompany a gentleman, whose transit had been arranged through foreign offices, from Constantinople by way of the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Burghas, thence by rail to Sofia. A few days later I was assigned to regular military duty with a Bulgarian evacuation hospital for wounded on the Macedonian frontier at Kustendil, which was also the headquarters of the 5th Bulgarian Field Army. I remained there for a month, during which time about one half of the 10.000 cases which passed through this hospital during the war were admitted. During the armistice which terminated hostilities, I was taken by the chief surgeon over the positions of the 5th Army and through the camps and sanitary stations.

After the conclusion of peace, in company with the American and British military *attachés* in Sofia, who secured the permission of the Servian War Office, I went from Sofia to Nish and from there to Komanovo and as far as Kochina, in the Valley of the Bregalnitca, in Macedonia, covering the battlefields of the Servian armies which were opposed to the Bulgarian 4th and 5th Armies with which I had had my service. I returned to Constantinople late in September, 1913, by way

of the Danube, Constanza and the Black Sea. In October, just one year after the defeat of the Turkish army in Thrace, but after the unopposed Turkish reoccupation of that province, I went to Adrianople and from there followed the route from the field of its defeat to Chorlu, where the headquarters took the train in flight to the Chatalja line. My return to Constantinople was by the Port of Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora. Later, I went again to the Chatalja district to view the scene of devastation wrought by the five different military movements which had swept over Thrace in a year. My return from this trip was by way of Silivri and the Marmora. In December, 1913, I took my leave of Constantinople by way of the Oriental Railway, stopping at Belgrade, and continuing through Buda-Pest and Vienna on my return to Paris.

First Lecture

The Causes and Course of the Balkan Wars

WHILE some recent events in the Balkan Peninsula may be cited as providing occasion for the Turko-Balkan War of 1912, the causes, obscured by racial prejudices, religious traditions and political aspirations, are so confused with the early history of Eastern Europe and even with that of Asia, that an understanding of the fundamental forces must involve a cursory survey extending back, at least, beyond the time of the Moslem invasion of Christian Europe to the earlier period when the eastern flank of the Roman Empire was the bulwark for Europe against the barbaric hordes advancing from the East and North.

A settlement on the Bosphorus, founded by the Megarian Greeks in the Seventh Century B. C. (658), was first called Byzantium, but after a well-seasoned maturity of 1,000 years (330 A. D.) it replaced Rome as the capital of the Roman Empire and since has been known as Constantinople from the emperor who made the change, Constantine the Great. The inhabitants of the city at this time were almost entirely Greeks and the language of the people and commerce was Greek. Only the ruling classes and the aristocrats, whom Constantine induced to come from Rome, spoke the official Latin, and later, after the fall of the Latin Empire in the Thirteenth Century (1261), the language of the court and the people alike was again Greek. For this reason the region that

was once the Eastern Empire is still cherished by the modern Greek as their patrimony. This spirit was most ingeniously revivified when Napoleon paid some attention to the Greeks. From their philology of his name and the fact of early Greek immigration to Corsica, he was hailed as a descendent of their race, and it is said that the women of Maina kept a lamp lighted before his portrait "as before that of the Virgin." In the dreams of "the glory that was Greece" the Hellenic race saw visions of the restoration of the Byzantine Empire under the Greek Emperor, Napoleon I. The victories of two years ago have revived again the vision of ancient empire, currently known as "The Great Idea."

History did not wait until the beginning of the Eighteenth Century for an appreciation of the strategical advantages or a desire for possession of Constantinople, like that of Peter the Great who said: "Whoever shall reign there will be the true master of the world." In the Fourth Century B. C. (390) Philip of Macedon laid an almost successful siege to the Greek Byzantium, until Demosthenes aroused the Athenians to send a relief expedition which saved the city until the Romans came several centuries later. The siege habit thus formed became so chronic that the great sieges of Constantinople, down to the present time, are said to number about thirty. The Roman emperors had not reigned a century (405-450, Theodosius II) before the capital was threatened by the Huns who came again within the next hundred years (527-562, Justinian) and made an almost successful assault.

The Slavs followed the Huns into the Balkan Peninsula and they in their turn battled at the walls of Constantinople. Late in the Sixth Century (580-600) the Slavs likewise in their turn were overrun and suffered the outrage of their "culture and

civilization" by a yet fiercer and wilder horde, detached from a biological glacier of Northern Asia, which swept from the banks of the Volga across the Danube and out onto the Balkan plateau. This grim, raw, invading race was called by the Greeks Voulgaria, and Gibbon interpreted this name of a "Volga-folk" into the form in which it occurs today as "Bulgar" or "Bulgarian." The very name of these people, once an epithet of hatred and contempt of the Byzantine culture of the Seventh Century, is still cherished by the modern Greeks as a term of bitter scorn applied to the derided and alleged civilization of the simple but worthy people bearing that name today. The racial characteristics of these invading Bulgars, despite the recent studies of the modern Greeks who have discovered that they once had hoofs, horns, and hairy bodies, were so little opposed to the good manners of the comparative civilization and culture of the Balkan Slavs whom they conquered, that within a century they were racially absorbed by their subject people and left only their name, as a mark of their passing dominance, to an empire which pushed its frontier almost to the Bosphorus at the time a Bulgarian prince laid siege to Constantinople early in the Ninth Century. We can thus see how in origin the people of the Balkan Peninsula are so confused and how futile has been their struggle to unravel the ethnological tangle that has been so complicated by their many changes of sovereignty. The Goths, Huns and Vandals passed elsewhere without leaving trace of their few centuries of sojourn. But there are people in the Balkans today, living in different colonies, who trace their origin to the Illyrians, Thracians, Greeks, Romans, Slavs and Bulgars, and upon these several boasted ancestries they are still striving to perpetuate race and to erect national institutions.

The Slavs in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula who were undefiled by the blood of the Northern Asiatics preserved their racial entity and developed national aspirations out of which arose the ancient Kingdom of Greater Servia. At one time or another, in the Middle Ages, a Bulgarian or a Servian Empire covered the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. In the Tenth Century (892-927) the Bulgarian Czar Simeon assumed the somewhat confident title of "Czar of the Bulgars and Autocrat of the Greeks." His successor Samuel extended the empire until Bulgaria, in this heroic age, reached from Adrianople to the Adriatic. As Macedonia was embraced by these boundaries, the "Macedonian Question," which still remains unsolved after all the attempts of ten centuries, was thus incidentally opened. It seems to have started, however, with those characteristic attributes, which, still preserved in the form of "atrocities," have continually re-echoed the cry, "Come over into Macedonia and help us!" It may be that the "Macedonian Question" was made something of a permanent issue by the Bulgarian Czar Simeon, who had such bad manners as to send back to Emperor Leo in Constantinople the Roman noses which he had removed from the latter's vanquished legions.

But the tide turned, as it has so often turned in the Balkans, and the Bulgarians were suppressed for a century and a half. Then the Orthodox Christian Emperor Basil in Constantinople, not wishing to be outdone in convincing cultural methods, sent to the Bulgarian Czar Samuel 15,000 Bulgarian prisoners whom he had blinded, except for one eye left to every hundredth man to lead his sightless comrades back to Samuel, who is said to have died from grief for their wretched plight. So it seems that atrocities are indigenous to the Balkans and were practiced by

Christian races, at least in their grosser forms, before the Turks came to add some of their own peculiar refinements.

About the end of the Twelfth Century, when the Bulgarian Empire was almost identical in extent with the "New Bulgaria," delimited by the treaty of San Stefano in 1877, the Byzantine Empire was hurrying to its end. Then Servia became so formidable that in another century Bulgaria was engulfed by a Servian Empire with a real czar like Duzan, who, in 1346, proclaimed himself "Czar of Macedonia, Monarch of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and people of the Western Coast." With traditions of such a monarch, how could any people forget their national destiny?

About this time a new and graver complication menaced the Balkan Peninsula, when the Turks, in 1359 A. D., crossed the Dardenelles and made their first entry into Europe. This was the real occasion for the first Balkan League, for, at that time, had the Bulgars and Serbs joined the Greeks against the Turks, they could have prevented the injection into Europe of an element that has always been non-assimilable and which must some day be returned to the shores of Asia. Von der Goltz Pasha, who, as military adviser, was with the Turks for twelve years prior to 1895, has told them repeatedly, and he said again, just before the last war, that their place was in Asia and their only hope and salvation lay in return to Anatolia to establish their capital on the ancient site of their early grandeur at Konia.

The Turks soon occupied Thrace and established an European capital at Adrianople. Then, as the Bulgarian state had been absorbed by the Servian Empire, the Balkan Slavs (Serbs and Bulgarians) under the Servian Czar Lazar, made their last stand against the Turks at Kossovo in Northwestern

Macedonia in 1389. With their defeat, the Turkish inundation of the Balkan Peninsula was complete except for Montenegro, which alone was unsubmerged. This little state began its existence at this time with a remnant of the Servian army which fled to the Black Mountains on the Adriatic, where they have since remained with the unique distinction and intense personal satisfaction of being the only people in Southeastern Europe to have escaped the Turkish yoke.

The Turkish possession of the Balkan Peninsula was completed when Mohammed the Conqueror crossed the Bosphorus and captured Constantinople in 1452, when Columbus was yet a boy.

In the Sixteenth Century, the Ottoman Empire, in the reign of Suleman the Magnificent (1520-1586), attained the zenith of its glory, when it reached from the Persian Gulf to Buda-pest, although a century later (1683) the western border was temporarily advanced to the walls of Vienna, from where the armies of the decadent sultans were turned back on that long recession, which, at last, bids fair to go beyond the Bosphorus. In the following or Eighteenth Century the Turks were driven out of Hungary and Transylvania, and, with Roumania always from that time on more of a Russian than a Turkish province, the Ottoman Empire had entirely receded within the Balkan Peninsula and became a wholly eastern state, lying south of the Danube and the Save and between the Adriatic and the Black Sea. In this period and state of repose of the Ottoman Empire, the "Eastern Question" assumed its modern form. It has been described as "the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the disappearance of the Turk from Europe," and now, after the diplomatic conferences and wranglings of two or three centuries, an approved solution seems about to be submitted by the more

definite processes of war. In the next or Nineteenth Century, Greece waged a successful war of independence (1815-21).

Servia, after passing through various vicissitudes, somewhat influenced by Austrian and Russian diplomacy and intervention in Turkish affairs, was offered, in 1820, recognition by the Porte as a sort of an autonomous province. Servian delegates sent to Constantinople for negotiations were kept there under observation for five years; then, after another revolution and when Turkey was involved in Egypt, the Porte finally recognized the Servian principality and thus liberated the latent forces of racial and national sentiment which developed into a powerful factor in the later disruption of European Turkey.

The next eventful discussion of the "Eastern Question," in 1854, assumed the form of the Crimean War, and although the Turk and his territory were the unconfessed elements of contention, the cause was given to the world in the sublime spectacle of two Christian nations (Russia and France) flying at each others' throats over the custody of the tomb of Christ, which happened to be in the keeping of the followers of Mohammed. It came about by Russia's thinking the final collapse of Turkey was near and demanding the recognition of her protectorate over all the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan. But as this was equivalent to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, France, England and Sardinia supported the Turks and defeated Russia. The only result of this belligerent discussion of the "Eastern Question" was the treaty of Paris (1856) which bound the signatories "to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire."

This period was followed by the development of a Bulgarian national spirit which had been gradually awakening to consciousness from the beginning of

the century, although it had been persistently and maliciously suppressed—not by the Turks, but by the Greek national spirit, exhibited through the political organization of the Orthodox Church in which all Bulgarians were communicants. But the Turkish government, at last, in 1870, in conformity with its long established policy of playing both ends against the middle, saw its opportunity to array one subject race against another, in order to keep them so occupied with their own troubles that they would be of less trouble to their masters. The Sultan then established an independent Bulgarian Church and placed its ecclesiastical machinery in the hands of a Bulgarian hierarchy under a Bulgarian exarch.

In this connection one might recall the incident of 300 years before, when, in 1472, twenty years after the fall of Constantinople, the separation of the Church of Constantinople and the Church of Rome was announced—the former taking the name of "Orthodox" and the latter remaining "Roman." The Greeks charged to the Latin Pope of Rome the responsibility for the desertion of the Bulgarians from the Orthodox Church and the Pope construed the event as a just and natural consequence of the schism of the Greeks. The Greeks, naturally outraged, resented the blow to their civilization and culture in the turning over to such a barbarous people as the Bulgarians a perfectly good religion which they had held in custody so long, and, besides, they maintained vehemently that it was all the worse, because there *were* no Bulgarians. Horrible spiritual atrocities, administered with vengeance and vindictiveness, were perpetrated by the Greeks upon the Bulgarians in the form of excommunications and damnation. The Bulgarians, however, had some little claim to a specialized religion of their own, if they wanted one, because their Czar Boris accepted

Christianity in the middle of the Seventh Century and became such an enthusiastic advocate of the newly adopted system of worship that he gave his subjects the choice of the new faith or one of his several favorite forms of extermination. The new faith became immediately very popular among the Bulgars.

Two Greek monks, Cyril and Methodus, went as missionaries to Bulgaria; Cyril invented an alphabet and reduced the Bulgarian language to written form. From the Cyrillic alphabet the Russian written language was derived and in this language the Russian Orthodox religion was taught. The Bulgarians, however, seemed to thrive on the expurgated religion of the Greeks as they used their own ecclesiastical organization so effectively in the awakening of a national spirit in their people that they produced, after only a few years (1876), an insurrection in Macedonia that was far from being contemptuous and which was reëchoed in the Herzegovnia. The Turks were held to have practiced such cruel atrocities in the efforts to suppress these uprisings that Russia again espoused the cause of the Sultan's Christian subjects. The Russo-Turkish War in 1877 was the direct result.

This war was closed, after the complete defeat of the Turks, with the prevention of the entry of the Russians into Constantinople by the armed protest of Europe. Peace was established at San Stephano in 1878 by direct negotiations between the belligerents. Though the terms were Slavonic and the principal provisions of this treaty established an independent state of Bulgaria, of about the same extent as the empire of the Middle Ages, it might have succeeded, if it had remained in effect, in establishing the equilibrium of the Balkans by bringing a homogeneous people under one national govern-

ment. And if the Treaty of San Stephano had not been supplemented by the Treaty of Berlin, the subsequent attempts to make the ethnographic conform to geographic boundaries in Macedonia might have been indefinitely postponed.

The local interests of the Balkans could not be isolated from the politics of Europe, which were united against Russia and forced the Treaty of Berlin as a substitute for the Treaty of San Stephano, and thereby effected a Teutonic instead of a Slavonic settlement. As England at this time feared more the aggression of the Slav than the Teuton, Beaconsfield supported Bismarck in the determination to prevent an eastern extension of the strong Slavonic frontier in the form of a new and strong Slav state.

The dissatisfaction of Europe with the Treaty of San Stephano was so definite that the suggestion for its revision at Berlin was not made without some demonstration. England ordered her Indian troops to Malta and called out her reserves. Austria mobilized. England at this time feared more from Russia than she cared for Macedonian Christians, but Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary who negotiated the Berlin Treaty, afterwards said that, in her support of the Turks, "England backed the wrong horse."

What the Treaty of San Stephano had formed into one state, the Treaty of Berlin divided into three parts, namely: The Turkish principality of Bulgaria, the Turkish province of Eastern Roumelia with a Christian governor, and Macedonia, restored to Turkey with certain reforms in government imposed. Besides this, Austria was permitted to occupy and administer Bosnia and the Herzegovnia and to establish garrisons and other controls in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, which, as Turkish territory, extended to the Bosnian frontier between Montenegro and

Servia, and thus effectually separated these two Slav states.

While all these details may be tedious and are of little interest to Americans, the man-in-the-street in Europe is quite well versed in them. My first and violent projection into the maze of European politics was occasioned by an Austrian whom I met in a railway carriage in his country, much after the fashion in which one meets the representative American in the smoking compartment of a Pullman car in this country. He said something about the "Sanjak of Novi Bazar." In my ears the unfamiliar name seemed to awaken some sort of association with, perhaps, the wandering Sinbad the Sailor, or the adventures of Robinson Crusoe, but my Austrian friend informed me that his country would be compelled to go to war if any nation violated the treaty rights and economic supervision that Austria exercised over the "Sanjak of Novi Bazar." This was more than two years ago, and this gentleman was neither a politician nor a diplomat; he was only a doctor. This irritating geographical blight is not really funny—except its name, and even that is very ordinary, after all. Turkish administrative divisions are "vilajets" or states and "sanjaks" or counties, and in this particular sanjak there is the town of Novi Bazar; hence the name.

While the Treaty of Berlin was made to suit the convenience of Europe as a bond of peace for thirty-six years, it received several little jolts before it was entirely jarred to pieces by Austria's recent ultimatum to Servia.

In view of the decidedly opposed opinions of at least two of America's "first citizens" as to whether a treaty is really a "peace bond" or only a "scrap of paper," it may be interesting to quote, in reference to the Berlin Treaty, the words of a contempor-

ary historian (William Miller), who, in March, 1913, long before the current controversy arose, wrote the last pages of his "*Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913.*" After giving a number of instances in which almost every signatory power and more than one small state had violated their solemn international agreements, he concludes: "But to regard the tattered Berlin Treaty as an inviolable law of nature is to ignore the fact that in the imperfect world of politics, international arrangements are only binding as long as the contracting parties choose to be bound by them or the population concerned are weak and disunited. When for the first time in history, the 'Little Neighbors' of Turkey joined hands against her with the double strength of enthusiasm and organization, the Treaty of Berlin, like all artificial creations, succumbed before the force of nature." An Areopagus seems now to be sitting through a winter session in both Belgium and Poland, which is devoting itself to the revision of this now obsolete document.

Bulgaria's national existence began under Prince Alexander of Battenburg in 1878. From the beginning, this young and patriotic ruler—he was only 23 years of age when he was called to his brand-new Bulgarian throne—showed more interest in the future of his state than in respecting Russia as its parent and regarding himself as the tutor of her child. There is no doubt that Russia intended to do what her political antagonists believed she would do; and that was to turn Bulgaria into an outpost for the Slavonic advance on the Bosphorus. In fact, Europe did not believe that Russia's southern progress had been stopped. It was known that her advance was only retarded, and it was also realized that another checking process would have to be applied on the sign of her next move.

But the Bulgarians had no intention, after their escape from the oppression of one master, to accept the rule of another, even though the latter had been their benefactor. This attitude, however, has eminent historical precedent, for Bismarck has said that a liberated people are always most exacting of their liberators. In 1885, after seven years of Bulgaria's national existence, Prince Alexander annexed Eastern Roumelia, after the almost entirely Bulgarian population had begun a revolution against Turkish sovereignty. Russia was offended and Servia was induced to declare war on Bulgaria on account of the threatened disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Russia's intention to discipline her ungrateful offspring was shown in her malicious efforts to cripple the defense of Bulgaria, so as to render her an easy prey to Servia. At the time of Servia's declaration of war, Bulgaria's army was concentrated in Eastern Roumelia, on the Turkish frontier, in anticipation of a conflict with the Turks. The strength of this army, including reserves and about 35,000 volunteers from Eastern Roumelia, was about 90,000 men, which represented the entire military resources of the state.

The military instruction of the Bulgarians had been begun by and was then in the hands of Russian officers, with a Russian Minister of War. For the eight years of the Bulgarian army's existence, the educational system had produced enough Bulgarian officers to fill all the subaltern grades and about half of the captaincies. All other commissioned grades in line and staff, from the Minister of War down, were filled by Russians. With this organization of the army, and with Turkey as a likely enemy to prevent the annexation of Eastern Roumelia, the Czar delivered a thunderbolt to the Bulgarians when he ordered all Russian officers to return to Russia just

at the time Servia declared war. It was for Russia to visit upon recalcitrant Bulgaria just retribution. The offish and uppish Bulgarian braggarts were to receive their fitting reward, as the Servians would march at once on Sofia to find everything in disorder and to achieve an easy victory. Crushed and humiliated, Bulgaria could then be brought to terms. On the day that war was declared the Servians had at least 70,000 men mobilized on their frontier, ready for immediate action. Whatever disadvantage this situation may have had for the state, it certainly made a fine day for promotion in the Bulgarian army. Captains, overnight, became Minister of War, lieutenant, major and brigadier generals, saying nothing of the few score of colonelcies and majorities that were scattered around. The successful work of army reorganization and the leading of the Bulgarian army to decisive victory, which dispersed the Servian army amply demonstrated the capacity of these young officers to discharge the functions of their new offices. The Bulgarians could and certainly would have marched to Belgrade but for Austria's warning that her troops would be met there in that event.

As an illustration of the hardy vigor of the Bulgarians in this campaign, an incident of their marching capacity may be worthy of mention in passing. A regiment, which had maintained its full strength of 5,000 men through a number of days of hard marching from the eastern toward the western Bulgarian frontier, arrived in the evening at Ischkeman, a town fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) east of Sofia. As a decisive engagement with the Servian army seemed imminent within a day or two, this regiment was ordered to proceed with all possible expedition towards the western frontier.

Without camping for the night, the march was

resumed and Sofia was reached by morning. As there were some foot-sore and sick which could not keep the pace of the column, a rather ingenious device was employed to help them along. There were at Sofia, at that time, 300 unbroken, untrained Hungarian remounts which could not be used in any regular military service. From the civilian community a fleet-footed leader—woman, boy, or old peasant unfit for military service—was turned out for each horse. The horses were led along the road until they met the regiment, when two stragglers were mounted on each led horse, and all were able to keep pace with the column as it arrived in Sofia. Here the peasantry had turned out along the roadside with rations prepared for the entire regiment, which fell out to eat and rest on the spot for four hours. The march was then continued for thirty-three kilometers (twenty-one miles) to Slivetza, where the decisive engagement had begun, and, as the regiment had not been previously engaged and had maintained its full strength, its arrival contributed materially to the Bulgarian victory.

This regiment had thus marched fifty-two miles in twenty-four hours. Packs and all equipment except rifle, ammunition and overcoats were abandoned, by order, as the indication arose along the line of march.

While this reference may be a diversion from the subject, the incident furnishes details that are of sufficient interest to be reviewed again under the caption of "A Forgotten Campaign."

As it did not suit the convenience of the Ottoman government to make armed resistance against the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Roumelia, and as Europe acquiesced in this violation of the Treaty of Berlin, rather than risk the general dangers of readjustment, Eastern Roumelia became a part of

Bulgaria and the territorial limits of the Bulgarian principality so remained, as thus established, until again disturbed by the Turko-Balkan War.

Following this successful accomplishment of Prince Alexander, Russian intrigues resulted in his abdication. Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg then accepted an invitation to the Bulgarian throne. About this time the Bulgars, as well as the Serbs, seriously and studiously renewed their active and forceful protest against the Turkish administration in Macedonia, through well organized and generally supported societies which were called "committees," with agents known as "comitajies." These comitajies sought to avenge the wrongs of their brothers in Macedonia, who still bore the galling weight of the Turkish yoke, and they also hoped to create such a disturbance as to induce the Christian world to release the Macedonian Christians from Moslem oppression. These Servian and Bulgarian comitajies, as agents of retaliation and discord, were "patriots" to their own race, either in or out of Macedonia, although they were "brigands" to the Turks. It was one of these Bulgarian comitajies, operating in Macedonia, who through his adventurous enterprise in holding for ransom our own Miss Stone, embarrassed the Turkish government into an acknowledgment of its helplessness to suppress such depredations, and held up the American missionary-supporting public for 13,000 pounds of Turkish gold, or about 59,000 American dollars. I saw this enterprising financier—Sandansky, by name—in Sofia at the time the National Assembly there granted him amnesty. I also learned the details of the money transaction from Mr. Peet, the manager of American missions in Constantinople, who counted out the Turkish gold to the "patriot-brigand" in a Macedonian village while under the surveillance of an

escort of a squadron of Turkish cavalry, charged with the duty of preventing the American ransom from passing into the comitajie's hands. A personal friend of Sandansky, whom I knew well in Sofia, assured me that Sandansky had not applied to his personal advantage a cent of the American contribution, but that it had all been spent in the cause of Macedonia.

In defense of the methods of the Macedonian revolutionists and the Bulgarian comitajies, it may be said that their cause could only be advanced by violence and that their resistance was made against a Turkish administration which every creditable European observer has invariably pronounced as economically abominable and personally intolerable to any but a crushed, spiritless and hopeless people. But the Turk's faults were in his methods of administration more than in his natural cruelty. His massacres and atrocities were no more than economic expediences, which to his form of government were necessities. The Turkish government in Europe has never been more than that of an army of occupation, and its subject and resentful races were disciplined by military methods which grew harsher with increased and repeated insubordination. The unhappy conditions in Macedonia continued, as the reforms, though always promised, were never executed, regardless of the assurances of the Treaty of Berlin. Outrages against Turkish authority were answered by Macedonian massacres.

The "Powers of Europe" had so long regarded the troubles in the Balkans as within their own particular sphere for adjustment, and the Christian inhabitants had so often appealed to this supreme authority for relief that the powers, viewing only their own selfish interests, seemed to overlook the possibility of the Balkan States themselves under-

taking the solution of that part of the Eastern Question which they had come to conclude was their own immediate concern. This very situation arose when Bulgaria, Servia, Greece and Montenegro entered into an alliance in 1911 to make a common cause against the Turk and settle by force of arms the grievances which 400 years of Eastern interference had failed to assuage. The chancelleries of Europe were all the while, secretly at least, advised of the progress of this project, but being unable to trust any one of their own number to exercise police authority or guarantee protection, the Balkan States were simply admonished that whatever they started, the powers would see that their disturbances did not result in territorial rearrangement.

Just a little while before, however, the attention of Europe was drawn to the Ottoman Empire by an event that created the favorable season for the Allies to settle with the Turks their long standing grudge. This was the breaking out of the Constitution, for Turkey had long since shown a tendency to catch the Constitution, which seemed to erupt on the exposed portion of her body in the form of a transitory rash and which tended to act as a sort of vaccination against any of the more serious contagious diseases which so often threatened her dissolution. Turkey first caught the Constitution in the beginning of the reign of Abdul Hamid, just before the Russo-Turkish War, when Russia was pressing the Porte for some atonement for the Macedonian massacres of that time. Then the crafty Sultan turned to the Constitution as a means of escape from Russian chastisement. The personal liberty and other things guaranteed by a Constitution, the Sultan argued, ought to be sufficient answer to Russian claims.

But as the war actually came on and the Constitution had no further purpose to serve, it was

withdrawn to await thirty years for a recrudescence. This second attack came, in spite of Abdul Hamid, in the summer of 1908 when Nazi Bey, a major of infantry and an enthusiast of the Young Turk Party which was then well organized in the army, marched his battalion up into the mountains of Macedonia, beyond the railhead of Monastir, and announced himself in arms against the Sultan. Two weeks later at Salonika the Constitution was proclaimed by Major Enver Bey, now Enver Pasha, Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire and one of the three men who, for the while at least, hold in their hands the destiny of the empire. The Young Turks were not quite prepared, but their revolution was precipitated by an unmistakable indication of a preparation of the powers for another interference in Macedonian affairs. The Sultan, however, making virtue of necessity, accepted the situation and announced the restoration of the Constitution which had been suspended since 1878. He started off by fulfilling its provisions for a National Assembly.

This change in the Ottoman government, and its threatened invigoration, suggested an Austrian advance on the Balkans, especially as Russia at this time had not recovered her military strength which was somewhat debilitated by the Manchurian war, and, being at this time unable to defend Slavonic interests in the Balkans, the Germanic influences were free to operate without fear of material opposition. The psychological moment thus arrived for Prince Ferdinand to proclaim himself "Tzar of the Bulgars" October 5, 1908, and, two days later, for Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzegovnia. The Bulgarian army was ready; the Prince had met the Austrian Emperor at Buda-Pest only a short time before; the Austrian army would support the Bulgarians. The Turks were fatalistically resigned, as

they were unable to resort to arms, but the Servians wailed bitterly, though helplessly, for the defeat of their national aspirations to regain Bosnia and the Herzegovnia which they regarded as their lost provinces, because they were once a part of a Servian kingdom of the Middle Ages. Servia was on the point of declaring war against Austria, and Montenegro, always spoiling for a fight, was eager to join her, but European diplomacy intervened, because no great power was ready to espouse Servia's cause.

The formal annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovnia by Austria, after the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 had specified the limited functions of Austria's occupation of these Turkish provinces, in the words of Prince von Buelow, the German ex-Chancellor, "led up to a great crisis." He states very frankly that Emperor Nicholas showed his great wisdom in his resignation to a diplomatic acceptance and that this incident was the first test of the Austro-German Alliance as "the German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision."

Turkey's bleeding wounds were soothed by an immediate application of a financial balm in the form of an Austrian indemnity of $5,000,000 and then she demanded $25,000,000 from Bulgaria. At this juncture Russian diplomacy played a tactful and tender part which, in a way, wooed Bulgaria away from the Austrian blandishments to which it had so lately yielded. Bulgaria offered only sixteen and three quarters millions for the twenty-five million demanded by Turkey. Russia effected a settlement by assuming the Bulgarian obligation to Turkey and accepting from Bulgaria in small annual installments the sixteen and three quarters millions which Bulgaria had offered to Turkey. Russia thus satisfied Turkey's Bulgarian claim by cancelling forty of the seventy-four annual installments which Turkey owed to

Russia as an indemnity for the Turko-Russian War. Turkey, in turn, was able to negotiate another foreign loan upon the resources relieved from the Russian mortgage and all contentions were thus happily reconciled.

On the 19th of April, 1910, the Porte finally recognized the independence of Bulgaria and this peaceful passing of the last of the Sultan's vassal states in the Balkans made identical the real and pretended frontiers of Turkey in Europe.

The Constitution, which was restored in August, 1908, had been received throughout the Ottoman Empire with such wild and hysterical delight that a Bulgarian dignatory actually embraced a Greek bishop; Turks bowed reverently to Armenian prayers in Armenian cemeteries for the repose of the souls of the Armenian victims of Turkish massacres; the Bulgarian brigand Sandansky was received like a prodigal son; a Turkish officer actually imprisoned a Moslem for insulting a Christian and Sir Edward Grey announced: "The Macedonian Question and others of a similar character will entirely disappear." Enver Bey made the beautiful and assuring announcement that "arbitrary government had disappeared. Henceforth there will be no Bulgars, Greeks, Roumanians, Jews or Musselmen; under the same blue sky we are all equal and we all glory in being Ottomans."

Less than a year was passed by all Ottoman subjects in this hysterical enjoyment of the fancied benefits of constitutional government, as this time was necessary for the Sultan to secure the loyalty of the garrison of Constantinople. In April, 1909, Abdul Hamid gave a regimental review in the hall of the National Assembly, as a ceremony in honor of its adjournment *sine die*, which he offered as a celebration of the recovery of the nation from the late

outbreak of the Constitution. Coincident with this event was another but more tragic one in Armenia, at Adana, in which several thousands of Armenians and two American missionaries were massacred. These were really the concluding functions of the "Red Sultan's" long reign, for in less than two weeks the Army Corps of Salonika, under Mahmoud Shefket Pasha, marched to Constantinople, attacked and subdued the Sultan's loyal garrison, hanged forty of its officers and deposed Abdul Hamid. A new Sultan was made by girding the sword of Osman on Abdul Hamid's brother, who had been his brother's prisoner and had not read a newspaper for years. The Constitution was again proclaimed and the counter-revolution was complete.

The Young Turk government again restored, it was soon inspired with fatuous and fanatical dreams of "Turkification" of the Ottoman Empire, by which the various races and regions were to be reduced to the dead level of Turkish uniformity, and, incidentally, induced to adopt the Turkish language. This form of pernicious activity awoke the Sultan's non-Turkish subjects—Arabs, Albanians and Christians alike—from the hysteria with which they had accepted the Constitution as a balm for all their woes and gave all the Balkan Christians, both in European Turkey and in the neighboring states, a new and sharp incentive to forget their own differences and unite against a constitutional tyranny more destructive to their hopes and aspirations than anything that had been conceived in the darkest days of the Hamidean reign.

The Young Turks were soon awakened from their wild idealism by the following disturbances: (1) Bulgarian protests against Moslem immigration from Bosnia into Macedonia; (2) renewed activities of Macedonian revolutionists and comitajies; (3) the

murder of a Greek bishop; (4) protests and threats from Crete; (5) a revolution of Moslems in Albania; (6) the appearance of a new Madhi in the Yamen; and (7) the Italian war.

The prophecy of an European ambassador (Nelidoff) that surely twenty months of the Young Turks would be worse for Turkey than twenty years of Abdul Hamid seemed to come true. This reactionary policy laid the way for the Balkan League, which was founded on the suggestion and with the aid of an Englishman—a Mr. Bourchier, the Sofia correspondent of the London *Times* and one of those accomplished Britishers who spend their lives in voluntary exile among a people whose affairs and language they learn and whose councillors or advisors they become. He first brought about an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia, and then Greece and Montenegro were eager to join.

A little incident in connection with the formation of the Balkan League may not be without interest in relation to some recent accusations against monarchs in leading their people into war. The Servian minister in Constantinople was calling on an ambassador to the Sublime Porte at the time when rumors of the preparation of the Balkan States to make war on Turkey were passing. The ambassador asked the minister if he (the minister) did not think it possible that some European diplomacy might influence his King to withdraw from the Balkan League. The minister replied rather significantly, "In Servia we kill kings."

General Savoff had completed the reorganization of the Bulgarian army. A French military commission had done much for the Greek army, and English naval officers had tuned up the Greek navy. The Bulgars, too, were well advised as to the actual progress made in the German reorganization in the

Turkish army. As a vassal state Bulgaria could only maintain a commercial agency in Constantinople which did not include a military *attaché.* I met in Bulgaria an officer who had been rated as a clerk in the Bulgarian agency in Constantinople. He was selected for this service because of his knowledge of English, and, while he did not enjoy the social status of a military *attaché,* he was able to discharge such duties, through his confidential relations with the British military *attaché* who gave him all the material that was sent to the British War Office.

The Balkan League did not long await an occasion to present its demands to Turkey, for in August, 1912, the signs of the coming storm were so plain to diplomatic meterologists that they definitely forecasted "unsettled," "threatening," and then "stormy weather" in the Balkans. About this time the comitajies set off a bomb among some Moslem officials in the little town of Kochina in Macedonia, and the Turks responded promptly and reliably in quite a spirited massacre of a considerable number of Bulgarian and other Christian residents of the village. This not unusual incident was repeated in Berane and Ishtip, where Servians and Greeks were the victims. I was in Kochina about a year after these incidents and just after the close of the second Balkan War, when the Servians were finally in control, although the Bulgars had taken the town first from the Turks and had alternated, several times after then, its occupation with the Servians. The quiet little village has a most attractive site at the foot of a mountain valley from which a clear, cool stream tumbles past several primitive mill sites and the usually pleasantly disposed cafés and furnishes that characteristic feature of "good water" of most every Macedonian community. The town bore numerous and unmistakable scars of the bitter strife

that had been so recently waged in the alternating supremacy of hereditary enemies.



There is a conventional sign of a prejudice recently expressed by the Moslem against the Christian group, or *vice versa*, in any Turkish village. It is seen in the quarter last to be disciplined, in the suggestive absence in all dwellings of doors, windows and sometimes roofs, and all easily removable and usable pieces of lumber. This despoilation not only gives a very uninhabitable character and appearance

to the places of abode, but also stimulates quite a visible building boom in the dominating portion of the village.

These latest Macedonian outrages gave the Balkan Allies splendid occasion to deliver on October 14, 1912, to the Sublime Porte an ultimatum, which they knew would be rejected, although they were able to base it on the high and just grounds of a demand for the immediate enforcement of the 23d Article of the Treaty of Berlin, guaranteeing Macedonian reforms, which the Ottoman government for thirty-four years had entirely failed to respect. This ultimatum was just like that more recent one that marked the beginning of a greater war. A demand was made on a government which the government could not force the people to accept. The Porte answered with characteristic insolence by the seizure of forty-five Creusot guns, then en route through Constantinople to Servia, and by the detention of all Greek shipping in the Bosphorus. Bulgaria then became a bit peevish and expressed some annoyance at the so-called Turkish "maneuvers" in Thrace, although Bulgaria had not overlooked her own military preparations, which had been continued from the time of her maneuver mobilization in August. All of this diplomatic conversation was held in the first weeks of October, and I passed over the Oriental Railway from Sofia, through Adrianople, to Constantinople in September when the sidings at every station were filled with military trains carrying forage, stores, horses, wagons and field guns so new that their bright, fair leather muzzle caps showed the first few greasy finger-prints. Everything seemed to be moving toward the Turkish frontier. Every culvert and bridge on the line had a guard of a few soldiers with their shelter tents pitched nearby. Maybe Bulgaria was not mobilizing, but at any rate

she was moving a few hundred thousand men with rifles and munitions of war to her eastern frontier, by which timely providence she was able to complete her mobilization with the wonderful rapidity that startled Europe and enabled the Bulgarian army to cross the Turkish frontier one day after the declaration of war.

The powers, though concerned only with their own larger interests in near Eastern affairs, became greatly alarmed at the military activity of the rude little Balkan States and gravely admonished all concerned that the powers would prevent, in case of conflict, any modification of the territoral *statu quo*. In the course of these diplomatic conversations, little Montenegro, on October the 8th, became impatient and fired the first shot at the great and invincible Ottoman Empire, and the world was amused if not amazed.

On October the 17th, Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Servia; the next day Greece declared war on Turkey, and so in answer to the question "Who started it?" the measure of responsibility can be equally divided.

On the following day, October 18th, a Bulgarian army crossed the Turkish frontier to attack Adrianople, and in the next two days two more Bulgarian armies had crossed the northern border of Thrace and started south for Kirk Kilisse. In about a week after the first contact, the Turkish army was in a confused and disorderly mass, in mad flight towards the Chatalja lines, thirty miles west of Constantinople, where Nazim Pasha, the Turkish generalissimo, was able to reorganize and intrench his frightened mob so as to repulse the Bulgarian attack which was made two weeks later.

In the meantime, the Servian main army started down the Valley of Morava, while one corps passed

through western Bulgaria to cross into Macedonia. At Komanovo, on October 24th, near the field of Kossovo, where the Turks had vanquished the Serbs 500 years before, the Servian army gained a decisive victory in a three days' battle. Less than a year later I was on the field of Komanovo with two military *attachés*, and I give it as their opinion, rather than my own, that it possessed the physical features that should provide a sense of tactical delight for either attack or defense as well as that splendid avenue for retirement—of which the Turks were glad to enjoy the benefits. It surely seemed to both the Bulgars and the Serbs that the victories over the Turks were not only the result of superior arms, but a divine answer, though somewhat delayed, to their Christian prayers of centuries for deliverance from their Moslem masters.

The Bulgars marched to a battle song, not lacking in many of the qualities of the "Marsellaise," with its refrain, "On to the Maritza," which they sang as they went out to avenge their defeat on the banks of that river centuries before, and it was on this same Maritza, at Adrianople, that their prayers were answered.

The Serbs, in their battle hymn, had sung "Remember Kossovo" as they marched against their ancient enemy to meet him so nearly on the field of Kossovo that they could regard his utter defeat as none other than providential.

And so it is little wonder that these hereditary enemies of the Turks marched and fought with a fire and frenzy which gave them strength, endurance and impetus that might have vanquished even better soldiers than the Turks. After Komanovo, the Servians, like the Greeks at Salonika, were invited to enter Uskub, which they at once rechristened "Skoplje," as this was its name when capital of

their ancient empire. Then, after an engagement that could be called a battle, at Monastir, the Serbs completed the conquest of their portion of Macedonia.

The Greeks crossed their frontier in two columns, one into Epirus and the other into southern Macedonia. They invested and laid siege to Janina, near their own frontier, and then, hurrying on in a mad rush to beat the Bulgars to Salonika, arrived November the 18th, just as a Bulgarian division appeared before another quarter of that city. On November 10th, or two days after the arrival of the Bulgarians, the Turkish commander surrendered to the army of the Greek Crown Prince, who refused to share the honors with the rival forces. The Bulgarian troops entered the eastern part of the city by their own leave, very much to the irritation of the Greeks, who stopped short, for the time, of using arms to drive them away. The Bulgarian division was reduced to a battalion during the course of the first war, and the force was at this strength when the second war began.

The Montenegrins, in their comic opera splendor and with ferocious valor, had fought their way towards Scutari, the Turkish stronghold that not only resisted the longest but still more tragically, was to be denied them finally through the intervention of European politics. The British military observer, who was with the Montenegrin army throughout their campaign, told me that these unconquerable mountaineers fought with a courage that was absolutely fearless as individuals, but with tactics that were entirely ridiculous as soldiers.

So it was that in four weeks after the first engagement of the Turkish army with the enemy, all that was left of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, except for the beleagured and hopeless cities of Adrianople, Janina and Scutari, and the Peninsula of

Gallipoli, which forms the western littoral of the Dardenelles, was the very tip of the Balkan Peninsula extending twenty miles from Constantinople. An armistice was declared between Turkey and all the Allies except Greece, who continued her hostilities during the following two months of suspended hostilities.

The Ottoman government at this time was in the hands of a party which had shortly before deposed the Young Turks. The most palpable defeat of Turkish arms could no longer be denied, and on November 29th, the ambassadors in Constantinople were requested by the Turkish government to intercede for peace. Nazim Pasha and General Savoff met between their lines on December 3d, and an armistice was signed between Turkey and all the Allies except Greece.

A conference was held shortly after in London, and on January 22, 1913, after much wrangling, the Turkish government agreed to accept the conditions demanded by the Allies. On the following day, while the Grand Council, in session at the Sublime Porte, was drafting the document of acceptance, Enver Bey and Tallat Bey, with a street crowd of not more than fifty partisans, entered the council chamber, murdered Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, and forced the resignations of the Grand Vizier and Cabinet. Perhaps this event was more of a *coup d'état* than a revolution, but whatever it may be called, there was no public manifestation of concern and but little evidence of the overthrow to be seen in the street. The Young Turks with Mahmoud Shefket Pasha would not commit the sacrilege, as they said, of ceding besieged Adrianople and the "tombs of the Sultans," notwithstanding the fact that none are buried there, nor could they sully the glory of the empire by sacrificing the Ægean and

Mediterranean islands, which had already been lost in war.

On February 3d, the armistice was denounced and war was renewed. There was no rational hope of relieving Adrianople, for the Bulgars were at least as secure on the west of the Chatalja line as the Turks had been on the east. Early in March, 1913, Enver Bey personally conducted a pathetic and frantic expedition from Constantinople with the purpose of landing on the north shore of the Marmora at Rodosto to take the Bulgars at Chatalja in the rear and to relieve Adrianople. The effort failed in its beginning with unorganized troops without rations, suitable transport or landing facilities.

I saw the daily progress of the preparation as made in Constantinople. The only seaworthy transport in the fleet was tied up at the dock adjoining the great floating bridge across the Golden Horn. The decks were crowded for several days with soldiers arranged in the same order that exists on a Coney Island boat on the Fourth of July, and these troops almost starved before the transport put to sea. The other craft in the fleet were of the New York ferry boat variety, equipped for shore water supply, and they were almost ruined by being kept at sea for two weeks with salt water in their boilers. A German doctor, who accompanied Enver Bey personally, and who saw the landing operations from the pilot house of the "flag ship," told me that only one battalion were able to get ashore and they were soon driven back to the beach by the Bulgarian batteries on the hills above the town. This is an incident of the frantic but misguided energy of which the desperate and fatalistic Turk is capable at times.

After this last gasp of Turkish arms, there was no other important event in the Eastern theater until

the fall of Adrianople on March 26, 1913. The fortress of Janina had fallen to the Greeks on March 6, 1913. The Servians had gone to the aid of the Montenegrins, who were still struggling before Scutari, and the last vestige of hope for the only remaining Turkish outpost in Europe thus passed. Hostilities for the second time were suspended on the Chatalja lines.

With the fall of Scutari, April 23d, the mailed fist of Europe appeared once more in Balkan affairs. Austria, stinging from the wound that Servia and Montenegro had given her parental pride by their forcible adoption of her cherished child in their joint occupation of the Sanjac of Novi Bazar, turned frantically for maternal solace to Albania, as the product of a violent and vicarious *accouchement forcé*, and wildly warned the world that not a hand should be lifted against the waif. Scutari was the head of Albania and Austria would not permit the savage Montenegrins to bite it off. This cannibal act was prevented by the rattling of European sabers, which restored Scutari to Albania and left the Montenegrins again smarting under Austria's wrongs. Here in this remote and obscure corner of the Balkans, after the local conflagration had passed, lay the still burning embers which so soon spread into the tinder box of Europe. On May 21st, the second peace conference assembled in London. On May 30th, peace preliminaries were signed with the delimitation of the Turkish frontier on a line running from Enos on the Ægean to Media on the Black Sea. The Bulgarians had been in undisputed possession of the western littoral of the Marmora, except the Peninsula of Gallipoli which formed the eastern shores of the Dardenelles, but the interest of Europe demanded the removal westward of the Bulgarian frontier to

leave in the custody of the Turks the great highway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

In this war thus closed, the most interesting and important feature was the Bulgarian campaign in Thrace where the Turkish Army of the East was so quickly and decisively defeated. Whatever the other Allies accomplished, in the defeat of the Turkish Army of the West, is only incidental to the Bulgarian success in the east, without which the other Allies could not have brought their campaigns to so definite an issue. The Greeks contributed a very important part by keeping the Turkish fleet in the Dardenelles and preventing the transport of Turkish troops by sea, and the Servians brought an important support to the investment and final reduction of Adrianople; but for all this, Bulgaria had the brunt of the hardest battles and endured the stress of the longer campaign.

Second Lecture

The Campaign in Thrace

WHAT little I know in a general way of the campaign in Thrace I shall relate in the form of a story of a visit I was permitted to make to Adrianople and to the battlefields and terrain of the rout of the *grande armée* of the Ottoman Empire just one year after that event had passed into history. The details of the strategy and tactics of the campaign may be found in the very complete report of the German General Staff. Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha, who commanded the 3d Corps of the Turkish Army of the East, has written an apologetic narrative of about the same import in which he defends his own tactical efforts and professional capacity. I had with me Mahmoud Moukhtar's report and the Austrian General Staff maps from which it was not difficult to locate any of the positions. I arrived in Adrianople with letters from Tallat Bey, the triumvir Minister of Interior of the Ottoman Empire, to the Civil Governor, and from Izzet Pasha, the Minister of War to the Commandant de Place. These letters conveyed in true Oriental form an acknowledgment of obligation for my moral and material support, which had done so much to sustain the empire in an hour of peril, and instructions to all civil and military authorities to make such signs of appreciation as might seem appropriate and discreet. The courteous and distinguished commandant, Mahmet

Ali Pasha, told me that I had shown commendable zeal in paying him the distinction of a visit to his command because any city, if it were the birthplace of a great man, the place of signature of a great treaty, or a scene of defense against a great siege, might well become a shrine.

During the course of my reception, a tall, soldierly officer attracted my attention as he cracked his heels before his chief, with whom he exchanged a few formal words. After the officer had retired, the Pasha asked me if I had noticed him and if I knew who he was. I could assure his excellency that I had not failed to observe his visitor, but that I was deeply humiliated by my ignorance of his identity. The Pasha then treated me to what I felt I was expected to appreciate as a most interesting revelation: "That officer you have just seen," he said, "is none other than the son of the great Osman Pasha, the defender of Plevna." As sieges in general, and that of Adrianople in particular had just been under discussion, it seemed quite appropriate to have thus awakened the memory of one of the Ottoman Empire's most distinguished soldiers, who had won his fame in one of the great defensive operations, upon which the later military glory of the Turks seems to have rested.

On the following morning the Pasha sent his best automobile and his favorite *aide de camp* for a daylight start on a tour of inspection of both the offensive and defensive positions concerned with the siege. We went first to the southwest sector at Kartal Tepe, a height from which the city and many positions can be viewed and which was the scene of the first desperate and successful struggles in the course of the Bulgarian investment in an effort to secure the observation station. The morning was hazy and damp; the automobile was left on

a road. We reached on foot the summit of Kartal Tepe just as a heavy fog fell which not only veiled the anticipated panorama, but entirely defeated, for more than a hour, all the strategy and tactics of our party in a reconnaissance fired in an heroic endeavor to locate the position of our transportation. Had it not been for the exercise of some considerable force, if not skill, in the art of vocal signalling, our units would have been so hopelessly separated that rescue could have been effected only by the noonday sun. While enduring the failure of our line of communication and waiting for the fog to raise we may turn to some conditions that are of interest in relation to the siege of Adrianople.

The city rests in a depression surrounded by a

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ring of hills which form a natural defense, except on the southwest, where the ridge is broken by the broad Valley of the Arda. To the northeast, the slopes are gradual towards the town, but drop away more abruptly to the front. It requires no great military sagacity for an observer to appreciate the natural elements of defense in this quarter which is of particular interest as it is the site of the assault which terminated the siege. Three confluent rivers (Arda, Maritza and Tunga) within the fortified area provide important strategical elements. The dominating architectural feature is the Mosque of Sultan Selim, said by many critics to be the most perfect Turkish mosque, with its four tall minarets visible a dozen miles in every direction, and, on a clear day, from the environs of Kirk Kilisse, thirty-five or forty miles away. On the other hand, as the minarets commanded a far view of surrounding country, they were used as observation stations during the siege. In peace times the civil population of Adrianople was about 80,000, but, by the influx from surrounding villages, it must have increased to 100,000 during the siege. Among the inhabitants there were more Turks than Christians, with the Bulgarians predominating among the latter.

The strategic value of Adrianople has always been appreciated and it has been frequently spoken of as the "Key to Constantinople." Its natural advantages have not been developed by the construction of roads in Thrace, although the value of its position as a base or pivot for operations against the Bulgarian frontier was recognized.

The railway from Sofia to Constantinople runs two miles south of the city through the station village of Karagach. There are only a few scattered trees in or out of Adrianople, except on that island in the Tunga, known in the turcophile romance of Pierre

Loti as "The Isle of Anguish." Adrianople had been fortified in some way since it first became the European capital of the Turks in 1363. Plans for its defensive rehabilitation, directed by Von der Goltz Pasha prior to 1896, were never entirely or perfectly executed. The works, all more or less remodeled ancient structures, consisted of thirty permanent redoubts not at all well concealed, protected by a complete circle of wire entanglements constructed a very short time before the war. The perimeter of the line of fortification is about thirty miles with axes varying from eight to ten miles. I think it has been generally conceded that Adrianople at the time of the siege was not a modern fortress, although the the work began under German direction, especially in the northwest sector—which might have been finished in several years—would have added considerable strength. Communication was not very good, because of a failure to provide sufficient bridges for the movement of troops over the several unfordable streams within the fortress area. The British military consul, who was in the siege and had been stationed at Adrianople for four or five years prior to the event, told me that the Turks had no good working maps of the fortress and that the only reliable and complete ones were to be found in Sofia and London. The British Military Consular Service is a peculiar hybrid diplomatic institution, but it serves quite effectually the ends of the British War Office in gaining military information in the remotest quarters of the world where the interests of the empire are vested, by assigning army officers to consular stations where, although they are known to be military officers, all the nominal and apparent duties are diplomatic and civil. I understand, however, that there is no regulation which prevents an officer on such duty from working overtime or at

night in a purely professional way. To the professional industry of the incumbent of the office in Adrianople, at the time of which I speak, I have reason to believe, is due the satifactory military information on Adrianople which the British War Office possessed.

Shukri Pasha, a general of artillery, who commanded the artillery in Thrace, was in command during the siege. The garrison in time of peace was an army corps of about 25,000 men, but at the time of the siege it has been estimated at from 50,000 to 55,000 men. But as the Bulgarians reported 60,000 military prisoners at the time of the capitulation, and as the losses probably were at least 15,000, the garrison must have been at least 75,000. The discrepancy in numbers is probably due to the many impressed Christians gathered from the surrounding villages. The investing force, before the armistice and when the fortress was only blockaded, was about 80,000, including two Servian army corps. After the armistice, when it was determined to take the fortress by assault, the besieging army consisted of 105,000 Bulgarians with 342 guns and 47,000 Servians with 98 guns, a total of 152,000 men with 440 guns. One observer remarks: "The garrison was large, but badly trained; the artillery was strong, but badly sited, and at the head was a man irresolute and weak in character."

It is said that for fifteen years General Fitcheff, the Bulgarian chief of staff during the war, devoted himself entirely to the preparation for the attack of Adrianople. On the study and secret reconnaissance of officers and agents in the preparation of a military map of Adrianople, the Bulgarians spent annually from $10,000 to $12,000 for a number of years. The work was finished in July, 1911—just a little over a year before the war. It was complete and accurate

up to that date, but it failed to show the most recently constructed positions and the barbed wire entanglements. Correct information on this detail had been submitted by agents, but it was not accepted as reliable because the locations seemed so absurd. The Turkish officer in charge of the construction of these obstacles, when the responsibility for this practical joke on the Bulgarian War Office was being passed around, explained that the wire was put up by soldiers during his absence and without his direction.

The attack on Adrianople was provided for in the mobilization and concentration of the three field armies with which Bulgaria organized for the Thracian campaign. The First Army was disposed for an attack on the center of the Turkish front extending from Kirk Kilisse to Adrianople. The Third Army was prepared for a descent from the north on the Turkish right at Kirk Kilisse. The Second Army was formed for a direct attack on Adrianople and was placed near Mustapha Pasha, the Turkish frontier station from which the railway and highway lines lead directly to Adrianople. This entire arrangement was not consistent with the Turkish understanding of Bulgarian strategy, for the Turks had been told by Von der Goltz, in words often quoted, that Kirk Kilisse was "so strong that only a Prussian army could capture it and then only after a three months' siege." Subsequent events, however, seem to have shown that even a German general can be mistaken, if, indeed, he were not joking or trying to intimidate the Bulgarians. It was considered by the Turks impracticable for the Bulgarians to advance in force from the north on Kirk Kilisse over the very rough and roadless country that intervened, and, expecting the Bulgarians to attempt to turn their left flank by way of Demotika, thirty miles

south of Adrianople on the Salonika railway, the Turks laid great stress on the defense of Adrianople.

In the first phase of the war, before the armistice, the Second Bulgarian Army accomplished its task of investing Adrianople with the aid of two Servian divisions, which arrived November 12th, soon after the battle of Komanovo, in which the Servians defeated the main Turkish army in Macedonia. At this time Adrianople was not much more than blockaded and it was not until after hostilities were resumed that it was definitely and resolutely determined to take the fortress by assault. Bombardment was first begun on November 25th, Kartal Tepe was taken, as it was required for an observation station and attacks were frequently made to develop the strength of defensive positions. Artillery fire was continued from time to time with the object of rendering residence in the city undesirable, but no general assault was attempted during the first phase of the war.

In the possession of Adrianople the enemy imposed upon the Bulgarian operations a great embarassment by the interruption of rail communication from Sofia to Chatalja. The railway line ran for several miles within the fortress area, where it also crossed the Arda on a bridge of some proportion and of great importance. This break in the railway necessitated a detour of thirty miles over bad roads, from a station west of Adrianople, for ten miles along the west bank of the Arda to Seminli, where the river was crossed, and from there to Demotika on the railway to Salonika.

The map prepared by the Bulgarians had marked on it in red stars the "strong positions" to be occupied in making the investment. This arrangement aided materially in both the early and later stages of the siege, as orders could be issued in simple form

for units to take definite positions. The preparations made for the final assault were very complete and it was fully believed by General Ivanhoff, the Bulgarian commander, that, except for some unforseen and almost impossible accident, the operation would be successful. Two elements determined the sector that was to be assaulted. First, the burden must be borne by the Bulgars, rather than the Serbs, as the moral right belonged to the former on account of their greater interest; and, as it was not feasible to make changes in the positions of the troops which had already been relocated several times, only the sector invested by the Bulgarians could be considered. Second, in the Bulgarian invested sectors, the position of the greatest natural strength was believed to be most vulnerable on account of the bad tactical handling of the defense and it was thought that the greatest surprise could be effected there because the garrison would least expect a determined attack at that point.

These considerations determined the northeast sector as the place of assault. An engineer officer of high professional attainment and Russian military education, General Vasov, was selected to conduct the strictly "one man" fire control, which was decided upon. Double lines of communication cables were laid from all positions to the fire control station. In order to conceal from the Bulgarian troops the date selected for the attack, General Vasov was given a fake leave order and it was widely advertised that he would be absent for the time covering the period for which the attack was set.

At 1:00 p.m., March 23, 1913, the artillery preparation was commenced on all sides except the northeast sector, where the heavy guns were not fired in order to mislead the fortress garrison. The final objective was to be the three forts in the

northeast sector—Tash Tabija, Avas Baba and Aiji-Yolu. The artillery fire was continued with full force until 8:00 p.m., when under cover of darkness the infantry advance began. Some artillery fire continued all night. In the darkness two divisions of infantry advanced on the east and the reënforced 56th Regiment advanced on the north until each met the Turkish infantry fire at about 800 yards' range. Here the attacking infantry halted until 5:00 a.m., March 24th. Then the 100 heavy guns placed to the north and east opened fire. The Turks in their advanced position fled to their nearby forts, pursued by the Bulgarians, until the former encountered their own wire entanglements where they were nearly all killed or captured by the Bulgarians. Twenty field guns and several machine guns which were taken were at once turned on the Turks. The greater part of this *mêlée* had occurred in the dim light of the early dawn.

By 7:00 a.m. the fire of the Turkish forts in the northeast sector had been silenced, when a heavy fog fell which gave the Turks a chance to recover and caused the Bulgarians to suffer heavily while digging themselves in at the foot of the hill, within 150 to 200 yards of the fort lines. In this trying situation part of the 56th Regiment found a dead space beneath the glacis of Avas Baba. The attacking force from the east found some shelter in the captured advanced positions, but the northern group fared badly in the Provadiisca Valley, where they received, at dawn, a heavy flank fire from the Tash Tabija fort. All day long the Bulgarians were protected by their artillery fire which made most all of the Turkish trenches untenable and reduced the Turkish artillery response. When night came, March 24th, covered by the full strength of their artillery fire, the Bulgarian pioneers opened passages in the

wire entanglements. The pioneers were divided into parties of four or five, to each of which some infantry from the 54th and 56th Regiments was assigned. Along this whole front about forty passages were cut, each from four to forty yards wide and from five to fifty yards apart. The entire front through which these openings were made was about one mile long. The loss due to this operation was only about sixty men. At 2:00 p.m. the final assault was made and the forts were entered. Shukri Pasha could not believe that his favorite forts were the first to fall. He had been deceived, also, by the vigorous demonstrations on the south sector, to which he had ordered all of his reserves. The fort Aiji Yolu was entered some little time before Avas Baba, but with no resistance to the final charge by the fleeing Turks. Other positions were not taken by assault, but surrendered from necessity as they were defenseless against attack from the rear.

The losses in the besieging armies in the final operations has been given as follows:

	KILLED		WOUNDED	
	Officers	*Men*	*Officers.*	*Men*
Bulgarians	24	1274	82	6573
Servians	6	268	7	1166
TOTAL	30	1542	89	7739

In the final siege the Bulgarians lost 8.5 per cent and the Servians 4.5 per cent of their troops engaged. The total casualties were 9,300 or about 6 per cent. Including all, the losses arising during the entire four months of the siege, the casualty rate was hardly greater than 10 per cent. The Turkish losses during the siege as estimated by the Bulgarians were about 15,000 killed and wounded, or about 20 per cent, as the prisoners numbered 60,000 men and 2,000 officers.

The Turkish medical officer in command of the mil-

itary hospital at Adrianople, the time of my visit, told me substantially the same. He said that a garrison of about 60,000 men had surrendered. Ten thousand wounded had been admitted to the hospitals with but a small mortality—2 per cent to 5 per cent. Two thousand were killed and there were thirty cases of cholera. There were two hospitals: one, the regular military hospital of the garrison adjoining the barracks near the town; the other, an Ottoman Red Crescent hospital at Karagach, near the railway station. There were no foreign Red Cross missions in Adrianople during the siege. The comparatively slight cost paid by the attacking forces and the heavy losses of the defenders seem to be due to the efficient plan and execution of the assault, to the tactical errors in the conduct of the defense, and to the technical faults in the construction of the fortress.

The Scene of the Assault

The fog which covered Kartal Tepe and veiled the panorama of the fortress of Adrianople, which we had hoped to view, left nothing to be seen except the ground beneath our feet, which showed the enormous amount of digging that had been done to provide, first for the Turks and afterwards for the Bulgars, shelter for the living and graves for the dead. The dogs of that yellow cur variety—so closely akin to the coyote—had already opened many of the graves and spread about the bleached evidences of the passed struggle for this position. A particularly fine specimen showing the effect of a gunshot wound, which I carried away from Kartal Tepe and preserved for a long time, has finally slipped out of my possession—by the accidents of travel, I believe, rather than by the cupidity of man.

The automobile finally recovered, the reëstab-

lished line of communication enabled us to reach the northeast front where the greatest interest lay about the fort Avas Baba, which the Bulgarians carried by direct assault. The commandant's aide tried in vain to induce a sentry who guarded the sally-port to admit us to the interior of this somewhat delapidated structure. There was no magic or open sesame in the name or "by the order" of the commanding general, for the soldier insisted that his own military acquaintance did not extend beyond his immediate and personal commanding officer, who, though indefinitely absent, had left him with instructions to admit no one—under the penalty of having his eyes gouged out or being subjected to some other and more terribly devastating form of mutilation. Inspection was limited, therefore, to the surroundings of this position which at that time—more than a year after the siege operations—appeared as though some great hog had rooted it full of waist-deep craters. The barbed wire entanglements still stretched about the foot of the glacis with suggestive gaps at frequent intervals, but with no signs of destruction by artillery projectiles. The aide very politely recalled an order which strictly forbade the use of a camera, but while his attention was diverted by my companion, a few harmless exposures were made.

There was one characteristically Turkish indication of recent military activity, seen in the almost completed work of regrading the glacis, so as to remove the dead space that had sheltered the Bulgarians in their assault, and on which, no doubt, complacent and comforting Oriental resignation had placed the whole tangible responsibility for the fall of Adrianople. The aide told me that the shrapnel fire was so destructive that "only dead men could live" in the infantry trenches about the fort, and,

after several regiments had been almost destroyed and driven out, it was found impossible to induce soldiers to return to them. There had been much rifle fire both going and coming about the wire entanglements as most every one of the angle-iron standards had one or more bullet holes flanged on either side, indicating a heavy fire in both directions. The trenches on the bank of the little stream about 500 yards from the foot of the bluff were much in evidence, and it was said that the greatest Bulgarian casualties occurred here where the right flank was exposed to the enfilading machine gun fire from Fort Tash-Tabija, which killed every man in the right sector. It is quite likely that the husky Bulgarian soldier, in digging himself in under these inspiring conditions, made a world's record on hasty intrenchments that, probably, will not soon be broken.

From Avas Baba and the crescent ridge of the northeast sector we motored to Fort Hederlick, the headquarters during the siege, of the fortress commander, Shukri Pasha, which could be seen near the opposite rim when one looked toward the southeast across the great shallow bowl which held the city. This position had no defensive value, as it lay behind the crest of the second ridge. It was the site of the radio station, by which communication with Constantinople was kept up during all of the siege. The original apparatus had been destroyed just before the surrender, but a duplicate, an ordinary field radio set mounted on a specially constructed wagon truck, was then in operation. By the time we returned to the city the afternoon had passed and there was not time remaining for an inspection of other positions, although I had had the opportunity of seeing the positions from which the operations began and where they finished—the beginning and the end of the siege of Adrianople.

A visit was made to that island in the Tunga where the Bulgars concentrated their prisoners immediately after the capture of the city. Pierre Loti has described the situation there (without seeing it) as a harrowing scene of Turkish suffering and of Bulgarian cruelty when he gave it romantic publicity as "The Isle of Anguish." I refer to this one incident because "atrocities in time of war" is a current subject and we can appreciate the difficulties besetting the search for the truth, even when the accusations and denials concern the several most loudly self-acclaimed standard bearers of "civilization." I have seen recently in the public press the "Isle of Anguish" incident finally settled by a quotation from the Carnegie Commission's Report of the Balkan Wars. The assertion that 1,800 prisoners were confined on an island in the Arda (?) River and that 200 of these died of hunger, cold and disease is supported by the following from the Carnegie Report:

"A member of the commission visited the island. He saw how the bark had been torn off the trees, as high as a man could reach, by the starving prisoners. He even met on the spot an aged Turk who had spent a week there, and said he had himself eaten the bark. A little Turkish boy, who looked after the cattle on the island, said that from across the river he had seen prisoners eating the grass."

It all came about through the unwise heroism of Shukri Pasha in his destruction of Turkish commissary stores and his demolition of the railway bridge over the Arda which interrupted communication with the source of future Bulgarian supplies. The Bulgarians simply segregated all Turkish prisoners on this island in the Tunga—not the Arda—fed them from the remaining Turkish commissary stores, and left the sick with only that medical attention which the Turkish medical officers might give. The British military consul told me that this treatment of the sick was the most atrocious thing the Bulgarians did. He

said that to his personal knowledge a fair ration was always issued and that, too, even before the railway communication was restored. Loti, however, published a heartrending account of the suffering of the Turkish prisoners who were so starved that they ate the bark from the trees. It is true that the bark of trees is gone, but it went for firewood rather than food. Our Turkish carriage driver began to give us the usual assurance that the Bulgarians starved their prisoners into "eating the bark off the trees like animals," but our companion and guide, a lieutenant colonel in the Turkish Medical Corps, contemptuously asked the driver if he had no sense of shame in affronting the intelligence of his auditors by such a monstrous assault upon verisimiltude and the truth. This officer then assured me that no intelligent person could be expected to believe the bark-eating romance.

From Adrianople to Kirk Kilisse we made a comfortable journey of nearly forty miles in about eight hours. The country showed none of the technical battle scars of trenches and earthworks, but the incidental signs of military devastation and reprisal were painfully evident in every village in this region, as in all other parts of Thrace. This wretched country had known in the year, just then passed the scourge of five, pillaging punitive armies, which came in the following order: First, the Turks when they advanced towards the Bulgarian frontier; and second, when they retreated; third, the Bulgarians when they pursued; and fourth, when they withdrew; and fifth, when the Turks returned to Adrianople. As the villages in Thrace are either Christian or Moslem, each army as it passed through a community of the opposite religious faith played the rôle of foreign invaders. Many of the wretched people we saw in the villages had returned to poke

around in the charred or crumpled remains of their homes in a struggle to find enough material to make shelter for the coming winter.

From Kirk Kilisse we journeyed again by carriage to the villages of Petra and Eskipolos, about ten miles from the Bulgarian frontier, from where could be seen the field of the first disaster of the Turkish Army of the East in its initial contact with the Bulgarians. Eskipolos marks the site of one of the fortified cities, extending from Adrianople through Bunar Hissar to Visa and then on to the Black Sea. They formed a line of frontier forts of the Byzantine Empire and are attributed to Justinian in the Seventh Century. It seemed rather fatalistic that the strategic position of these ancient citadels should again mark the line of battle in a conflict which would again change the frontier of a state. Each one of these ancient forts surmounted an acropolis. From the ruined citadel of Eskipolos I could see the Bulgarian frontier and the openings of the valleys through which the 1st and 3d Bulgarian Armies invaded Thrace. We were insistently assured by the merry villagers who flocked with us that on a clear day we could see the minarets of the Mosque of Sultan Selim in Adrianople. The field of the first engagement of the Thracian campaign lay before us.

Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha, who commanded the 3d Corps of the Turkish Army of the East, in a published volume entitled "My Command in the Balkan Campaign," to which I have already referred, has thrown a few spotlights on his command which seem to clearly illuminate the unhappy internal condition of the whole Turkish army and to frankly reveal some of the causes which led to its defeat. This officer, who may be accepted as one of the most aristocratic and distinguished of the Turkish service, was for many years under instruction in German

military schools and the German army. His report naturally confesses the otherwise well-known disastrous results of his operations, but its greater burden seems to be a defense of his own military conduct and training. His high standing and professional accomplishments may be better appreciated when it is known that both prior to and during his incumbency as a corps commander he was Minister of Marine in the Turkish cabinet and that, after he left the army on account of wounds he received at Chatalja, he became the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin.

Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha joined his corps October 17th, five days before its engagement. He was promoted to command of the 2d Field Army November 1, and returned to his corps when the army was reorganized at Chatalja. In the beginning of his report he speaks naively of the innumerable difficulties which arise at the last moment in what he calls "bringing an organization to the height of modern standards."

"It had been the custom of corps headquarters to work until 2:00 a.m. which naturally prevented any work at all during the following morning. I gave positive orders at once for everybody to abandon such habit and to commence work at 7:00 a.m. and for clerks to begin at 5:00 a.m. From 9:00 to 12:00 officers were ordered to mount and go to the troops. At 3:00 p.m. all officers were to assemble at headquarters, but it was not possible to abandon the offices completely from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m."

On October 22d, one of his division commanders made the following report concerning an incident of a disordered retreat of the night before in the neighborhood of Petra and Evikler: "Only the men who knew the cause of the noise remained in position. A certain number of officers, thinking of the fortunes of their families, left the ranks and disappeared, and, as a good many soldiers were natives from the

surrounding towns, they, too, took advantage of the darkness to return to their homes." (Page 38.)

Djemil Bey, then a division commander in the 3d Army Corps, but at the present time one of the triumvirs of the Ottoman Empire and the Minister of Marine, seemed to have been most energetic and discerning. He reported to his chief the cause of the rout in the retreat on Visa as follows: "If we have not succeeded in reorganizing the troops, the fault is due more to the lack of instruction than to moral force. The companies generally had only one officer, who often did not know what to do. At the least difficulty these officers would cross their hands, remain inert, and, in some cases, would quit the ranks and leave their men to get out of their awkward positions without assistance, saying at the time: 'They do not obey us.'" (Pages 46-47.)

On October 29th, Ali Bey sent the following report to Mahmoud Moukhtar: "When the enemy threatened our left with two battalions, our men yielded, crying out: 'We do not want to stay without artillery support, our troops are now retreating towards the town; nothing can stop them.'" (Page 61.)

October 30th, Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha published an order which, in the following paragraphs, reveals something of the sanitary situation: "The wounded will be gathered by the men from the regiments and then transferred to Karakal with the means available at the time. Their transfer to Visa will be effected afterwards, using the empty ration and ammunition wagons." (Page 84.) This corps in its first engagement, one week before, had had six field hospitals, and while I do not find it so recorded, I have no doubt that at this time the Bulgarians had them. On the follwing day, October 31st, Mahmoud Moukhtar issued an order which

sought to set aright some slight deficiencies which had arisen in his supply department:

"1. In order to assure the subsistence of your division, organize two kitchens. Use the battalions in the neighborhood of the banks of the Soghudjuk. Have a company prepare dinner for everybody. The company commander will report immediately to the corps commander and will then receive orders from the chief of staff.

"The detachment of engineers attached to the corps is directed to procure the necessary wood and to build ovens.

"The battalion from the Denzli Division will furnish the necessary men for transportation." (Page 91.)

Of the situation on this day, Mahmoud Moukhtar makes the following comments:

"Besides, the convoys were pillaged en route, and on this account some of the troops occupying the trenches remained without bread and water. On account of the small number of officers it was not possible to prevent the disorganized battalions from abandoning their positions and going after rations."

On November 1st, orders from the same source were published, of which the following is a paragraph: "As it appears necessary to provide rations for the men who have not drawn bread in the last few days, two flocks of 100 sheep will be driven, one towards the left bank of the stream, the other towards Porgalikoj. To the flank guard (three battalions and one battery) there will be sent hardtack and the necessary sheep." (Page 101.)

On the night of October 31st, Lieutenant Colonel Raghib made this report to Djemil Bey, his division commander: "Under such conditions, the detachment fled to a more favorable position where they spent the night. Two hundred men failed to answer reveille and were counted missing, as no one knew what had become of them. The companies had just been formed out of irregular elements, so that no one knew his neighbor. The Egerdu Battalion,

which fell into an ambuscade, had lost eight wounded and two dead. My men were already crying with hunger at the time of leaving Visa and have received nothing to eat since then. I ask that orders be sent me relative to their supply." The stern Djemil Bey, shocked by this brutal outrage of the first commandment of the art of war, but unmoved to pity by this cry of bread, gave back this cruel stone: "If your detachment has fallen into an ambuscade, it shows that you have not taken the precautions prescribed by Field Service Regulations. The responsibility for this incident, so definitely prohibited, falls upon the commander. Stay were you are and occupy the important points." (Pages 104-105.)

On November 1st, Lieutenant Mahmed Sia Effendi, a subordinate officer with a battery attached to two infantry battalions, made the following report: "At this critical moment all of the advance battalions began to run away and no attention was paid to any command." (Page 105.)

Mahmoud Moukhtar, after he had discovered a very filthy condition in his camp on the Chatalja lines, issued another sanitary order of some significance: "By reason of cholera, the intensity of which is increasing, there will be established in each camp, latrines of one meter in depth. These will be filled up every other day and new ones dug. There will be an inspection by the corps commander in person." (Page 155.)

Communication and information was not very good at any time. Two days after the first action the right wing was out of communication with Abdulla Pasha (the army commander) and all official correspondence was addressed to Nazim Pasha, the generalissimo and Minister of War at Tscherkesol. Out of this situation difficulties arose, as Abdulla

decided to retreat to the bank of the Ergene, and Nazim ordered a stand at Karach-dere.

On October 28th-29th, Nazim telegraphed Mahmoud Moukhtar the following information:

"Vienna newspapers announce the right wing of the Bulgarian army at Adrianople, and its left is about to envelop Kirk Kilisse where they expect great results.

"The correspondent of the *Reichpost* informs me that the Bulgarian revictualing is complete and that their march is resumed. The west wing of Dimitrieff's army is on the line Jenikoj-Baba-Eski. The center is about Kawalki. The right wing is advancing on Bunar Hissar-Visa-Saraj. The Bulgarians seek to cut the Turks off from Constantinople and terminate the campaign in one week."

This information proved substantially correct, and, as it was received by a very roundabout way from newspaper sources, it seems to have some bearing upon the place of a newspaper correspondent with an army.

The Turkish commanders, however, seemed to have held the tactical aid of Providence in somewhat higher esteem than did Napoleon, because Mahmoud Moukhtar, in an order informing his corps of an offensive movement, said: "With the aid of Allah the enemy has been compelled to retreat." About this time, November 1st, Mahmoud Moukhtar was given command of the 2d Field Army and Nazim telegraphed him: "May Allah wish that your offensive may be crowned with success." Mahmoud Moukhtar telegraphed his acknowledgment of his new appointment to Nazim and said: "Allah has permitted the 3d Corps to cause the enemy to retreat today." (Page 116.)

The history of the Thracian campaign might almost be written in tragic incidents which marked the conduct of the Turkish army. A story which I heard in Bulgaria and which is given in the German General Staff report would fittingly make the first

record. On October 18th, the day war was declared, the 2d Bulgarian Army, concentrated on the railroad, started by that route to march on Adrianople and crossed the frontier about noon. In the morning of this day the commander of the Turkish frontier guard sent over to the Bulgarian outpost a polite request for a few rations of bread, as the Turkish commissary had grown so poor about then that his men had not had much to eat for several days. The bread was supplied, but it had hardly been expended before the Bulgarian advance guard wandered down the railroad track and explained their business so definitely that the Turkish guard surrendered without resistance.

There were a few Turkish battalions and batteries near Mustapha Pasha, the first town on the railroad and on the Maritza, which were so astonished at the appearance of a large number of Bulgarians that they hurried on to Adrianople without much discussion. There was a very important bridge over the Maritza at this point which had been prepared for demolition, but only part of the explosive charge was detonated. A bit of the bridge railing and a piece of the roadbed was blown up, but was at once repaired and did not delay the Bulgarian column at all. Not even the telegraph line was touched, so that the whole railroad system fell into Bulgarian hands and enabled them to establish their base at once beyond the Maritza River, which could have been made a serious obstacle to their advance.

The Campaign

The general features of the Thracian campaign, apart from the investment of Adrianople by the 2d Army, may be briefly sketched in the advance from the Bulgarian frontier (October 18th) of the 1st and

3d Bulgarian Armies, with a total strength of 75,000 each, or a combined force of 150,000, which comprised about one half of the total of 300,000 Bulgarian fighting men then in the field.

The Turkish Army of the East, exclusive of the garrison of Adrianople, was at this time incompletely mobilized in two armies, with a front along the line Adrianople—Kirk Kilisse, and a strength of from 110,000 to 120,000 men. The 1st Bulgarian Army, marching towards the south, met the advance guard of the 1st Turkish Army a little in advance of the center of the line Adrianople—Kirk Kilisse (October 23d at Seliolu) in an engagement which, while not of a general character, is said to have been one of the fiercest incidents of the campaign, as one Bulgarian regiment lost 250 killed and 750 wounded.

The 3d Bulgarian Army, marching as the advanced left wing to the southeast in the direction of Kirk Kilisse, encountered with some resistance the Turkish 2d Army, or right wing (October 23d at Petra and Erikler), a few miles in front of Kirk Kilisse. During the night following these two engagements, both of the Turkish forces became demoralized and retreated in disorder under conditions which Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha has described in his report already quoted. The 3d Army passed on to Kirk Kilisse without obstruction, as the Turks had fled towards Luli Burgas and Visa, but it delayed at Kirk Kilisse three days without pursuing the advantage so unexpectedly gained. The 1st Army was not permitted to advance, as under instructions from general headquarters it was held back between the two other armies to await the results of their operations.

A bitter controversy has lately arisen between General Dimitrieff, commanding the 3d Army, and General Fitcheff, Chief of the General Staff, con-

cerning the delay in the advance of both armies which, in the light of subsequent events, was fatal to the Bulgarian prospects of a termination of the war shortly after this time. General Dimitrieff says that he wished to advance at once from Kirk Kilisse, and that, after his enforced three days' delay, when he again attacked the Turkish right in a movement which developed into the battle of Luli Burgas, the 1st Army did not come up to his support until the last of the three days of hard fighting.

The action about Luli Burgas, which has all the attributes of a real battle, covered a period of five days (October 28th to November 1st, inclusive) which, with the development of the positions on the first day and the retirement of the Turks on the last day, left three days of the severe engagement. The Turkish army made its stand on the rampart-like slopes of the eastern bank of a creek (Karakatch-dere) which flows from the north past Luli Burgas. The front of twenty to twenty-five miles' length extended between the only two roads running east and west through Thrace; one on the south through and from Luli Burgas towards Constantinople, and the other on the north from Kirk Kilisse to Bunar Hissar and Visa. These two roads limited the operations and extreme flanks of both armies. Abdulla Pasha, the Turkish commander (October 30th, at Saskiskny), stood on a prehistoric mound, rising from a slightly predominating ridge four or five miles behind the center of his line, where other commanders in the unnumbered wars in Thrace may just as well have stood, and, like him, they might have viewed the splendid spectacle of an army in desperate action along its fifteen to twenty miles' front. But as he was more of a privileged observer than an active commander, all day long on the hardest fought day of the battle, and on the day following as well, he

was entirely out of communication with his right wing and only the coming and going of an occasional orderly and a few staff officers gave him the appearance of directing the movements of the left wing. He had no telegraphic nor telephonic communication with any part of the field, and, after viewing the tragic spectacle of the defeat of the "*Grand Armée*" of the Ottoman Empire, he could only hasten to lead his routed legions in their retreat. Only the persisting patience of the Turkish soldier, even though he found himself in the midst of disorder, to which he is so thoroughly accustomed, could have endured the hunger, fatigue and fright with so little tendency to those excesses which make such situations so horrible. Only the Turkish soldier could have maintained his tranquility so as to permit himself to be reformed into a new army behind the defenses of Chatalja.

It may be said for Abdulla Pasha that, as he realized the mobilization of his army to be incomplete, it was his plan to stand behind the upper reaches of the river Ergene, where the railroad would have served his line of communications better, and where he might have gained some time in collecting his forces. Some of his corps commanders, however, interceded with Nazim Pasha, the Generalissimo, who ordered the position which precipitated the battle of Luli Burgas. In the battle of Luli Burgas and in those incidental and preliminary engagements in front of the Adrianople—Kirk Kilisse line, the Bulgarian losses were about 20,000, and more than 90 per cent of the number were borne by the 3d Army.

The Turkish losses have been variously reported, but it is hardly possible that the actual numbers can ever be known, no matter what "official" statistics may be prepared later; a fair estimate seems to be at least 30,000. With about 140,000

Bulgarians and 110,000 Turks participating, the losses were at least 15 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively.

Just a year later I made a little journey over the Thracian battlefields, without having then any definite knowledge of their details or a prearranged itinerary. I started out to visit the more important points and as many as possible of the towns I had heard of, in the course of the local gossip of the war. I had learned the names of the scenes of a number of engagements from my hospital patients. I went everywhere that ordinary carriage transportation and other facilities permitted. When my trip was all over and I began to check up, I was surprised to find that I had visited every scene of action of any importance, except that of the 1st Bulgarian Army, a little in advance of the line between Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse (at Seliolu). I have since thought that this coinidence is somewhat suggestive, as, in the movements of the opposing armies and my subsequent peregrination, there was no place else to go, and if one goes anywhere in this region in Thrace, unless he uses an aeroplane or resorts to sapping operations, he must follow very closely the same route. After reaching Luli Burgas, I went out to the villages (Saskiskny and Ahmedbey), five and seven miles eastward, where Abdulla Pasha had spent his three nights and where, also, he had watchfully waited during the three days of his last battle. From a little ridge between these villages, and within a radius of fifteen miles, the entire field can be viewed without intervening obstruction, as one can readily locate the horizon positions of Luli Burgas, Bunar Hissar, Visa, and, finally, Tchorlu, the railroad station where Abdulla entrained and thus formally terminated his Thracian campaign. The country at this time could be traversed in almost

any direction by a carriage and going was generally better across country than on any of the wretched roads—as we have known it in Cuba and the Philippines in the dry season.

During the campaign, however, the rainy season had made any sort of going anywhere almost impossible, as the whole country was then virtually a quagmire. It has been said—and a look at this region surely seems to support the statement—that had the weather conditions of October, 1913, prevailed in October, 1912, the Bulgarian successes would have been prompt and decisive. The rather frequent streams which flow into the Ergene from the north, in shallow valleys and only a few abrupt banks, divide the surface into easy going swails and low, rolling hills, over which any sort of transportation can be taken in any general direction when the season is favorable. After the abandonment of the field, the terminal phase of the campaign was completed by the defense of the Chatalja line, which was taken in a natural position about twenty-five miles in front of Constantinople and which had been further prepared years before for just such an event. The peninsula at this point, about twenty-five miles in width from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora, takes its name from a nearby town. It is further narrowed by two bodies of water, extending in from each coast, to about sixteen miles. A broad valley, running north and south, except from a short distance towards the north, separates two prominent ranges of hills and jutting-out hogbacks. The Turkish position was on the east of this valley and the Bulgarians on the west. The two weeks following the battle of Luli Burgas, before the Bulgarians could prepare their attack (November 17th-18th), gave the Turks time enough to dig themselves in and to hold their position. A short time after what is known as

the battle of Chatalja, as it was apparent to the Turks that they could not assume the offensive, the Turkish government asked for intervention which resulted in an armistice (December 3d.) Hostilities were again resumed and again suspended by another armistice. (See chronological table of events, Appendix.) During this latter period of inactivity, the Bulgarians withdrew their right wing six or seven miles along the coast of the Marmora to simplify their difficult problem of supply, as a glance at the map will indicate. Shortly afterwards, the Turks advanced their left wing across the bay of Bujuk Chelmudje, under the pretense of doing something in a military way, although they never induced the Bulgarians to change their lines from the position in which they were reformed. The reorganized Turkish 10th Army Corps which formed this advanced left flank was no doubt the result of some political indication.

When I accompanied the chief surgeon of the Chatalja army on a special sanitary inspection, he made a special point of one visit to the 10th Army Corps with which we spent a night at Kalalratia. This command seemed to base its principal claim to distinction on the presence of a young officer who was its chief of staff, as he was none other than the then hero-worshipped patriot and now the Ottoman Empire's Man on Horseback. Although he was only a lieutenant colonel and the chief of staff of a pasha and general of division, commanding the 10th Army Corps, the entire command was keenly alert in the sense of appreciation of the supreme honor of Enver Bey's presence. Turkish hospitality, to even a stranger, is always impressive, not only in form but in substance as well, when the latter observation is economically practicable. The chief surgeon of the 10th Army Corps was particularly happy in his

opportunity to meet the special indication of entertaining his dignified chief, Abdul Selim Pasha, the chief surgeon of the army and the latter's honored guest, as the chief surgeon could support the form of his hospitality with the real substance of a presentation to Enver Bey. "You have heard of Enver Bey; did you know that he was here—the Chief of Staff—and that you can see him?" was almost my first word of greeting.

The evening was very dull because this alluring and glittering promise could not be fulfilled as it was rather reluctantly revealed to me that "Enver Bey" —the name spoken almost with bated breath—"was fatigued and begged to be excused." But the new day brought its sunshine and the fulfillment of its promise in a reception for which the corps commander and his headquarters was used as a setting, as Enver Bey entered at just that time which the rules of the drama so carefully prescribe. He appeared as a young man of pleasing and noticeable appearance, carefully dressed and faultlessly groomed—even without the credits of the discount for field service conditions. He bore himself with an air of calm but supreme confidence, which, in the light of his boldly romantic career, might easily be attributed to a fanatical inspiration. His manner was formal and martially precise, and, incidentally, his time was short. Later in the day as we were leaving the western shore of Bujuk Chekmudje and about to cross the bridge, we encountered the Corps Commander and his staff. The dignified old gentleman, riding up to the Sanitary Pasha and myself, greeted us both pleasantly, thanked us for the honor of a distinguished visit and confided us, hopefully, to the care of Allah. Then a clatter of hoofs, just approaching, which attracted our attention, enabled us again to gaze upon Enver Bey as he galloped by, stiffly

saluting, with an escort of soldiers vastly more pretentious than that of the pasha whom we had just left. As we took our leave of the escort from the 10th Army Corps, the chief surgeon in receiving my thanks and appreciation of his bountifully generous hospitality, found his greatest comfort in my expression of rapturous satisfaction in having seen Him—Enver Bey. There can be doubt that Enver Pasha, as the new honors of Minister of War and Generalissimo, which he has modestly conceded to himself now entitles him to be addressed, is a man of vision, possessed of a courage and a nerve combined with ready initiative and fanatical determinations which, now that he is actually in the saddle instead of being merely master of the ring, will very shortly determine the destiny of the Ottoman Empire.

It will be remembered that in the second war, after the Roumanians had crossed the Danube and the Bulgarians had been several weeks away from their position on the Chatalja lines, Enver Bey, in violation of the orders of the Generalissimo, marched with a cavalry column to the "capture" of defenseless Adrianople, and, in this feat of recovering the first European capital of the Osmanli Turks, he became once more the nation's hero and the empire's undoubted Man of Destiny.

Third Lecture

The Second Balkan War

THE Second Balkan War, much more definitely than the first, was but a flash of the steel in a minor event of the great Slavo-Teutonic contest. The Balkan States were only playing the part that fell incidentally to their unhappy lot in holding the bag and washing the dirty linen of the principal contestants.

Just a reference to an event that followed the Berlin Treaty will suffice to establish this relation of the greater politics of Europe to the Balkan States. In 1881 and 1889 Austria-Hungary formally declared, in secret treaties with Servia, that she "would support Servia, in the event of the latter's finding a way of extending her southern boundary, the exception being made of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, and that she would aid in the extension of Servia in the direction of the Vardar Valley." The perfidy of this platitude is evident when it is recalled that the Austrian occupation of Bosnia had solidly blocked Servia's natural extention into that Slav territory, while the inviolability of the sacred Sanjak of Novi Bazar had made hopeless the coalescence of Servia and Montenegro. Austrian diplomacy thus turned Servian ambition for extension toward Macedonia, whose population, up to 1870, the Servians had unquestionably conceded to be Bulgarian.

The organization of a Bulgarian National Church in 1870, which gave formal character to the Bulgarian

communities throughout Macedonia, stimulated a Servian national movement towards the south, after the Austrian check was placed on extention towards the west. In 1903 the murder of King Alexander, which was so popularly approved in Servia though disapproved elsewhere—especially in royal circles—removed a dynasty, and, by releasing Servia from the influence of Austria, gave a new impetus to a Servian national spirit.

A Bulgarian (Liouben Karavelow) wrote in 1870:

"The Greeks show no interest in knowing what kind of people live in such a country as Macedonia. It is true that they say that the country formerly belonged to the Greeks and therefore ought to belong to them again. * * * But we are in the Nineteenth Century and historical and canonical rights have lost all significance. Every people, like every individual, ought to be free, and every nation has a right to live for itself. Thrace and Macedonia ought then to be Bulgarian since the people who live there are Bulgarians."

It is no doubt easy for the Christian world to appreciate the traditional emnity that existed between the Bulgarians and Turks, as it is so readily attributable to differences in religion, but there has been some surprise occasioned by the bitterness and ferocity of the strife that so soon arose between the Christian Bulgarians, Servians and Greeks, after their common enemy, the Turk, had been eliminated. The cause of the differences between the Bulgarians and Servians can be dismissed in a word; it was the result of extraneous political influences which set these two similar and almost identical people against one another in fratricidal war. But the Bulgar and the Greek have been separated by a breach that began to widen almost with the dawn of history. The Greeks and Bulgars had been allies for only a year, and when their common enemy had been removed, their individual differences became more acute on account of the jealousies aroused by the

conflict of their respective claims to territorial extensions in Macedonia.

The soldiers of the three allied armies—counting the Servian and Montenegrin as one—had together fought the first war to a successful finish. They felt they had achieved their ends and the second war seemed to them inexplicable. If the Turks had accepted the conditions demanded by the Allies, in the course of the first armistice, and if the first war had terminated, as it would have done in January, 1913,—but for a government revolution in Constantinople,—it is most probable that the second war could not have been fought, as none of the armies—always excepting the Montenegrins—could not have been induced at that time to fight again. It was necessary for the Greek press to inflame their people, and for the Bulgars to learn that their brother Servians were about to betray them, in the violation of a sacred treaty. The Servians had absolutely nothing to do but stand pat, as they were in possession of and proposed to retain that portion of Macedonia which, by treaty, they had conceded to Bulgaria. This treaty became more sacred to the Bulgars as a "bond of peace" and grew more profane to the Serbs as a "scrap of paper," while the final adjustment of the first war was pending. The Greeks have a press, but the Bulgars have not. The Greeks are the peddlers, traders and advertisers of the East, and they spent, most industriously, the first six months of 1913 in proving the Bulgars to be ruthless and inhuman savages, and inspiring the Greek soldier with his mission as "an appointed avenger of civilization against a race which stood outside the pale of civilization."

With the exception of Bulgaria, the first war was practically over, so far as the Allies were concerned, at the end of 1912. The formal termination was

marked by the treaty of peace, signed in London, June 30, 1913. In this interval of six months the Servians and Greeks had little to do, except to arrange themselves in their conquered territory in Northern and Southern Macedonia respectively, while the Bulgarians, from January to June, 1913, bore the constant burden of holding the Turk in his place on the Chatalja line.

The question of partition of the territory wrested from the Turk was a matter of vital concern, especially to Bulgaria, because her allies were in actual possession of a part of Macedonia, which Bulgaria thought she had just right to claim. Bulgaria's contention was based upon a treaty, duly and solemnly signed, sealed and attested by both Bulgaria and Servia, in which the delimitation of the Servian and Bulgarian portions of Macedonia were specifically defined.

This instrument, popularly known as the "Secret Treaty," was signed at Sofia, February 29, 1912, or about seven months before the declaration of the first war, but it was given to the public by a newspaper in Paris in the spring of 1913, when the second war was brewing. Besides the definite meandering of a line which both parties agreed would separate the new Servian from the new Bulgarian Macedonia, there remained another area, confessed to be in dispute, which was left to arbitration. As the issues of the first war were practically settled, Bulgaria asked Servia to evacuate that portion of Macedonia which the secret treaty had granted to Bulgaria, but which Servia still occupied. Servia proposed arbitration. Bulgaria was pleased and ready to arbitrate the matter left for arbitration by the treaty. Servia demanded arbitration of the entire matter of the division of Macedonia, which was, in fact, a disregard for the the terms of the treaty which Bulgaria

insisted was valid, and should become effective without arbitation.

Bulgaria had conducted her campaign and had contributed much the strongest force in the war against the Turks, in confidence that the treaty would secure her rights in Macedonia, although she knew the fortunes of war must send the Servian army there to take it away from the Turk. These, then, were definite positions in the controversy. Both parties were perfectly willing to submit something to the arbitration of the Russian Czar, but they could not agree upon the question to be arbitrated. It was simply a little matter of either sacred or profane regard for a treaty, and, at that time, the self-styled "civilized world" lost patience with these wild Balkan people for fighting over as sordid thing as the spoils of the first war. Maybe some *ex post facto* process of the civilized world's international courts will some day restore to the barbaric Balkan States the good character of which they were despoiled by the self-righteous judgment of a "higher civilization." The Russian Czar threatened to hold "responsible"—whatever he meant by that—the state which started a fight, and for that reason neither Servia nor Bulgaria felt privileged to strike the first blow. Not so, however, with Greece, for she was without the pale of Russian influence or punishment, and was free to indulge her petulance.

Servia urged, as her reason for not respecting the treaty, that the conditions at that time differed from what they were when the treaty was signed, as Austria, through her insistence on the autonomy of Albania, had driven her back from the Adriatic, and had robbed Servia of that which she coveted most—an opening to the eea.

Austria could not deprive Servia of all the fruits of her victory. The Servian occupation of the San-

jak of Novi Bazar, in conjunction with Montenegro, could not be disputed by Austria, in addition to Austria's prevention of Servia's occupation of Albania. With the Sanjak of Novi Bazar lost, Austria was so determined that Servian access to the sea should be prevented by the creation of an autonomous Albania, that in the spring of 1913 she mobilized in Bosnia eight to ten army corps, with a strength of about 200,000 men at a cost of $84,000,000. As about one half of this sum was expended for military stores, which might be used again, the cost of the mobilization was really about 40 to 50 million dollars—not a trifling amount for Austria to spend in merely "bluffing" Russia. Russia was not ready, and the game was closed for the while. Austria's hat was in the ring, but Russia's was not ready to be tossed. While this little incident would hardly be noticed in America, in Europe it was the cause of great concern, and for a reason more apparent to us *now* than then.

This process of diplomatic settlement was favorable to the Teutonic interests, because it enabled Austria to take even a better strategical position, from which to execute the movement assigned to her by the Germanic Alliance, which was the ultimate advance of her eastern flank to Salonika, and the establishment there of a naval base, from which the Ægean might be controlled and the Dardanelles guarded against the emergence of the Slav into the Mediterranean. Austrian interference with the territory taken from the Turks by the Servians is, no doubt, the crux of the situation which led to the second war, because, if Austria had not blocked so effectually Servia's advance to the sea, Servia would have been so pleased with this realization of her fondest hope that in her gratitude she would certainly have had no thought of disregarding her treaty, and

she also might have conceded to Bulgaria the disputed Macedonian area, which the secret treaty had left for arbitration.

The long delay in the settlement of the issues had brought Bulgaria to the rather urgent necessity of getting some action at once, or resigning herself to what the Servians and Greeks saw fit to offer her. Her army was exhausted, and the peasant soldiery, believing that they had won what they had been fighting for, were feeling the call to their fields, in the time of the approaching harvest.

The second war was one of most informal beginning, although its course was one of great intensity. There was no formal declaration, and as the first war ended formally June 30th, after a long delay following the actual cessation of actual hostilities, the Allies had had time to array themselves in defense of their respective interests. In order to make history easy, it may be said that the second war began July 1st, the day after the first war ended.

On June 21, 1913, General Savoff, the Bulgarian generalissimo, sent the following telegram to the commander of the 4th Bulgarian Army, who was at Seres:

"I.—There is an alliance between the Servians and the Greeks, whose object is to hold and divide the whole territory of Macedonia on the right bank of the Vardar . . . . for the Servians; Salonica and the regions of Pravishta and Nigrita for the Greeks.

"II.—The Servians do not recognize the treaty and do not admit arbitration within the limits of the treaty.

"III.—We insist that the arbitators start from the basis laid down in the treaty, *i.e.*, concern themselves solely with the contested zone. Since the non-contested territory belongs to us according to the treaty, we desire that it should be evacuated by the Servians or, at least, occupied by mixed armies for such time as the *pourparlers* are going on. We make the same proposition to the Greeks.

"IV.—These questions must be settled within ten days and in our sense, or war is inevitable. Thus within ten days

we shall have either war or demobilization, according as the government's demands are accepted or refused.

"V.—If we demobilize now, the territories mentioned will remain in the hands of the Greeks and the Servians, since it is difficult to suppose that they will be peacefully handed over to us.

"VI.—The discontent which has recently manifested itself in certain parts of the army gives ground for supposing that there is a serious agitation against war. The attention of intelligent soldiers must be directed to the fact that should the army become disorganized and incapable of action, the result will be as described in paragraph V. Reply with least possible delay whether the state of the army is such that it can be counted on for successful operations."

The Bulgarian premier told the cabinet that the Servians would more than likely make war on them after any arbitration which would give Bulgaria her claimed advantages, and that he thought it better to fight it out then.

Servia consented unreservedly to arbitration. The sentiment of the Bulgarian cabinet was not in favor of war, but it is now certain that public opinion and General Savoff, whose military glory had extended his influence into politics, were for war.

On June 28th, General Savoff sent another telegram to the commander of the 4th Army:

"In order that our silence under Servian attacks may not produce a bad effect on the state of mind of the army, and on the other hand to avoid encouraging the enemy, I order you to attack the enemy all along the line as energetically as possible, without deploying all your forces or producing a prolonged engagement. Try to establish a firm footing on Krivolak on the right bank of the Bregalnitca. It is preferable that you undertake a fusillade in the evening and make an impetuous attack on the whole line during the night and at daybreak. The operation is to be undertaken tomorrow, June 29th, in the evening."

General Savoff also sent a letter of instructions to the 5th and 6th Armies, outlining several details of his conception of the political situations, in which he said: "Since our enemies are in occupation of

territories which belong to us, let us try by our arms to seize new territory until European powers intervene to stop our military action."

It is imputed that the King gave Savoff his instructions, but the General remains silent on the subject. At any rate, consequent unhappy results of Savoff's actions demanded some sort of an explanation, as an order of a regimental commander directing a part of the attack on the Servian lines soon became public. Savoff was made the diplomatic and official "goat" by his relief from the command of the army without any other official assignment. The official reports of the junction of the 2d and 4th Armies in the last days of the Macedonian Campaign state that these armies, on account of the common task assigned to them, were placed under one commander whose name is not given. This man was Savoff, as I believe I know from my personal relations, to the situation at Kustendil where I saw General Savoff.

Bulgaria suffered sorely from the disadvantage of her position, as she was compelled to keep her main army at Chatalja until the terms of peace were signed. The other Allies had months to entrench themselves in their positions where the Bulgars must meet them. Bulgaria had, at the very first, to abandon the Chatalja lines, with the Turkish Army still on her newly guaranteed frontier, and to concentrate all her forces on her west and southwest borders.

The Greeks with their main army in Salonika, started their part of it by an attack on the battalion that the Bulgars had maintained at that point. The Bulgars nudged the Servians in Macedonia, but the latter said they were not fighting. It was claimed to be an outpost contact. The Bulgars defended their western frontier against the Serbs, and met the

Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks in Macedonia south of Western Bulgaria. There in Macedonia, in the valleys of the Bregalnitca and the Struma, the campaign continued through the month of July, while the wily Turks slipped back into Adrianople, and the Roumanians crossed the Danube on their way to Sofia. With this new enemy within á few days' march of her defenseless capital, Bulgaria was compelled to sue for peace. An armistice was declared August 1, 1913, and the treaty of Bucharest followed. This instrument not only gave to her former allies all that was in dispute, but it took from Bulgaria some of the territory she had won from the Turks, and delivered "the most unkindest cut of all" by robbing her of an intergral part of her original domain. So the Second War ended in a state of local tension greater than that with which the first began. There has been left among Christians animosities and hatreds more bitter than had existed between Christian and Moslem, and all factions only wait for a favorable opportunity to resort again to arms.

Bulgaria, today, by reason of the advantage taken of her in the treaty of Bucharest, in August, 1913, cherishes a most bitter resentment for the parties to the "hold up," namely, Roumania, Greece and Servia, which she will exhibit in arms when her first opportunity arrives. This, too, will not be an action of the government in pursuit of a diplomatic policy; it will be an expression of a deep and enduring sentiment of her people. Under present conditions Servia, Greece and Roumania are not free to assume any other military burdens, and Bulgaria, therefore, holds the "balance of peace" in the Balkans, though not for her inherent interest in the abstract principles of peace.

With the neutrality of Bulgaria assured and guaranteed, which is manifestly impossible under

present conditions, it is probable that both Roumania and Greece by this time would have allied themselves with one of the sides in the European War. Roumania must make the first move in placating Bulgaria by the restoration of the stolen province of the Dobrudza. Such action will leave Bulgaria free to turn her front towards Servia and Greece. Servia, being sufficiently occupied at present, Greece alone remains to restrain Bulgaria's pressure. As Greece has ambitions in the Ægean and Albania, which could be better pursued after securing Bulgarian neutrality, she might see her way clear to return to Bulgaria her (Greece's) portion of the loot of Bucharest. After that, Bulgaria's enforcement of her secret treaty with Servia, which caused the Second Balkan War, would be a matter of simple military migration into Servian Macedonia, which the treaty gave to Bulgaria. Then all the Balkan States would be free to make their alignments in the great war and Bulgaria's position would be determined to the extent of enforcing the terms of the Treaty of London, which gave her the Enos-Media line as her frontier with Turkey, but which the Turks violated by their return to Adrianople after the Bulgarian army was withdrawn from Chatalja, at the beginning of the Second War.

This movement for Bulgaria would not heavily tax her resources, as the Turks are now engaged in other military adventures so critically affecting their destiny as to make the defense of Thrace a mere incident. With the recovery of the province of Dobrudza, and the undisputed occupation of Macedonia and Thrace, Bulgaria's ambitions would be so wholly realized that her consequent desire to enjoy the blessings of peace might permit the Balkan States, as far as they, themselves, are concerned, to live happily ever after.

It is my purpose to attempt to describe with the

aid of a campaign chart the general movements of the Bulgarian armies in the Second War. But to safeguard you against the dangers of accumulating misinformation I will quote a warning given by one of the most careful and experienced students of Balkan affairs, who has written several books on subjects pertaining to the Near East, and who says:

"I have seen enough of Eastern countries to entertain the utmost distrust of any specific statement of fact, with regard to occurrences which are alleged to have taken place there, no matter on what authority the statement is based."



The Campaign

Although in the tactical operations of the Second Balkan War, the Bulgarian Army seemed almost to run the gamut of misadventure and misfortune, which began with the inherent difficulties of her political situation and ended in her humiliation and disaster, these unhappy results were brought about not by her former Allies alone but through foreign political influence and by the intervention of another enemy. I believe that there is enough evidence at hand to show that Bulgaria was about to extricate herself from her generally considered insuperable difficulties with the Servians and Greeks, when Roumania intervened and prevented the successes which she was about to achieve and which would have won her certainly more favorable terms in settlement with the allies if not a complete victory.

The sketch (Page 76) which shows the territory, lost by the Turks, as it was occupied by the several allies on July 30th, at the time the Second War began, will readily reveal the difficulties encountered by Bulgaria in making her military distribution without indicating a preparation for war. On the other hand Servia and Greece enjoyed the great advantage of the six months of military preparation, quietly though energetically made during the time that Bulgaria was detained in Thrace pending her settlement with the Turks.

General Savoff was Commander-in-Chief when hostilities began as the result of Bulgaria's political blunder which was rather too highly seasoned with military adventure, for an event not accompanied by a declaration of war. This mistake was almost immediately realized, but the attempt to correct it, by stopping the aggressive, which was only meant to be a demonstration, proved futile because the Allies in

their turn assumed the offensive and thus compelled Bulgaria to continue the war.

In an attempt to describe the general features of this campaign, it is not without profound regret that we approach the disquieting indication for the employment of the so-called "names" of places and even of persons (not to be mistaken for harsh epithets), which are portrayed by groups of phonetic symbols, so vicious in assortment and vile in arrangement that they suggest to the Christian eye some heathen blasphemy, or, more happily perhaps, only unutterable sounds. But as the accompanying map bears the names of all the places mentioned, it is hoped that this unhappy situation, resulting from too many centuries of philological carelessness and confusion to be corrected at this time may outrage no more than the eye and that the tongue at least may remain pure.

General Savoff's strategic plan for the conduct of the war provided for an immediate invasion of Old Servia, with an interruption of the line of communications of the Servian army in Macedonia, which would at once place it in an untenable situation and leave a sufficiently large Bulgarian army to conquer the Greeks. On the other hand, it was the plan of the Allies for the Servians to advance slowly, while the Greeks pushed back the Bulgarians as speedily as possible, thus bringing about the contact of the Servian right with the Greek left for a final effort that would either crush or envelop the Bulgarians.

Five Bulgarian armies were distributed for the tactical execution of this strategy as follows: The 1st Army of forty battalions was concentrated on the Servian frontier south of the railroad in the Pirot district, opposed to sixteen Servian battalions. The 3d Army of forty battalions was placed at Vlassina, near the pass south of that occupied by the

railroad, for an attack on sixteen Servian battalions at Surdulica. The 5th Army of forty battalions was on the Macedonian frontier beyond Kustendil in front of Egri Palanka. The 4th Army was on the line from the Valley of the Strumica to Istip and Kochina in the Valley of Bregalnitca with reinforcements available to place ninety-six battalions in this section. The main Servian army, in front of the 4th Army, consisted of about eighty battalions in five divisions, placed on the line from Egri Palanka (near the Bulgarian frontier), along the western slopes of the Valleys of the Zletovska and the Bregalnitca and then down the Valley of the Vardar to Lake Dojran. The 2d Army was distributed from Kukus to Kavala, so as to contain the Greek army, but without any real concentration. While its organization consisted of two divisions of fifty-seven battalions, including six battalions of railroad guards, it had an actual strength of only 35,000 men. The entire Greek army concentrated about Salonika numbered about 120,000.

The combined Bulgarian armies had a strength of about 220,000, to which was opposed about 115,000 Servians and 120,000 Greeks, or an allied army of 235,000. The Bulgarian concentration had been started a month before the beginning of the war, but all of the divisions of the 4th Army were not in position on July 29th. The Bulgarian disadvantage in this situation may be appreciated when it is remembered that the entire Servian and Greek armies had held their positions for six months with nothing to divert their attention from constructing defenses and making other arrangements for the campaign.

The left wing of the 5th Bulgarian Army rested on Rujen, a mountain 2,235 meters high, on the southwest frontier, which was connected by a broad

saddle, fit to be called a causeway, to an adjacent Macedonian mountain, Car-Vrh (Sultan Tepe), 2,104 meters high. On the latter, the Servians mounted heavy guns and built an automobile road for fifteen or twenty miles from Egri Palanka towards Kochina in the Bregalnitca Valley. I have been over this terrain from Komonovo to Egri Palanka and Kochina, where every position had been most elaborately prepared by the Serbs against Bulgarian attack and for their own retreat. There were miles of trenches that were never occupied. As the Bulgars had no road to Rujen, and so could not avail themselves of its superior tactical advantage, they were unable on this terrain to make any advance and could only conduct a *guerre in place.*

The political complications with which the campaign began so muddled up the military arrangements that it was not possible for the Bulgarian strategy to realize any of its inherent advantages. General Savoff was relieved from command on July 3d, the fourth day of the war, with some political fan-fare and a telegram to St. Petersburg, it is said, announcing the summary dismissal from office of the culprit who, without authority, had started the war. In the second week of the war it was rumored in Sofia that General Savoff was in disgrace and had been dismissed from the army. Sometime later he was really, though informally and almost surreptitiously, sent to command the 4th and 5th Armies at Kustendil, where I saw him in the third week of the war.

General Dimitrieff became commander-in-chief, and, whatever may have been his virtues and abilities, the venerable though disaster-inviting process of swapping horses while crossing a stream, which permits a new commander to execute or muss up the plans of his predecessor, already in operation, was

bound to work to the great disadvantage of the Bulgarian army. It seems that everything went amiss from the very first. The 1st and 3d Armies moved into Servia on July 6th, to be recalled on July 9th, and instead of cutting the Servian army off from its base, while the 4th Army immobilized it in its front, the Servian army was left free to attack the 4th Army in superior numbers from a most favorable position.

This surprising and disrupting change in strategy is attributed to the Russian demand upon Bulgaria to confine the conflict to the disputed zone and not to muss up any new territory. There can be no doubt that that abrupt change was made only on some demand or threat from a foreign source, for which Bulgarian commanders were not responsible. The same restraint being imposed upon Servia, the entire theater of operations was then confined to Bulgaria's Macedonian frontier. The 1st Army was then broken up and distributed to the 4th and 5th Armies as the progress of the campaign indicated, and, more particularly, as the greater difficulties of transportation permitted. The impetuosity with which these movements were made was revealed in the unintentional separation of battalions from their regiments and companies from their battalions, as I certainly know from personal observation.

After the first week of the war, as there was no important change in the position of the 5th Army or of the Servian Army concentrated against it, the principal interests in the campaign lies in the theater occupying the valleys of the Bregalnitca, Strumitca and Struma, where the Bulgarian 2d and 4th Armies met their first reverses against the Greeks and Servians.

Position In the Servian Theater

In the evening of June 29th, the 4th Army made its unexpected, though unfortunate, attack upon the Servian Division on the western slopes of the Zletovska valley, which was renewed from the positions thus gained on the morning of July 30th. The Commanding Officer of the 4th Army then received an order to discontinue hostilities and to open negotiations with the Servians for an armistice. The brigade commanders received their orders about noon and at once suspended the action. The men, believing the fighting over, left their positions and were separated from their arms. The Serbs did not receive the parlimentaires but made an unexpected attack which routed the Bulgarians with great losses. Following this advantage the Serbs occupied a position which commanded Istip, from which, in a few days, the 4th Army was compelled to retire, with the right wing passing up the valley of the Bregalnitca to Kochina and the left wing into the valley of the Strumitca. As the line of supply of both the 1st and 4th Armies, which had been maintained by rail from Adrianople through Drama and Seres, would be interrupted and, as both armies would then be based on Sofia through the valley of the Struma, it became necessary to protect the new line of communications.

As the Commanding Officer of the 4th Army received orders to retire and to protect the right flank of the 2d Army, on July 7th, he sent the artillery and wagon trains of his left wing through the valley of the Strumitca to enter the valley of the Struma at Petric, in withdrawal towards the Bulgarian frontier.

Position on the Greek Theater

The battalion of 1,000 men is the conventional unit of measure of strength in the Balkan armies,

although the division unit is used in a more technical sense. The Bulgarian division, however, is much larger than the Servian or Greek divisions, as the former consists of three brigades of two regiments each and the latter do not use brigades but assign four regiments to a division. As four battalions form a regiment, in all of these armies, the normal composition of a Bulgarian division is twenty-four battalions while that of the Greek or Servian is sixteen battalions.

In the 2d Bulgarian Army, all of the organizations were so depleted that with fifty-seven battalions, thirty-five batteries and ten escadrons (one fourth mounted) the total strength was only 35,000 men. In the entire Greek Army, which opposed the 2d Bulgarian Army, all of the organizations were at full strength, as it had taken a very subordinate part in the war against Turkey and it had had sufficient opportunity after that time to complete the cadres, so that the ninety battalions with about 1,200 men each, eighty-four batteries and ten escadrons made a force of about 120,000 men. The Bulgarian organization as it is here given is taken from Bulgarian reports, which also estimates the Greek army as a little more than twice the Bulgarian strength; but from Greek sources I have the Greek strength as 120,000. The Greeks had a greatly superior advantage in artillery suitable for the mountainous terrain of the campaign, in that they had sixty mountain guns while the Bulgars had only twelve.

For the graphic description of the general tactical features of the campaign, the 2d Bulgarian Army may be fairly represented by six brigades of 6,000 men and the whole Greek Army by ten divisions of 12,000 men each.

Positions

The Bulgarian 2d Army was distributed along

a front of 130-140 km. (80-85 miles) in length extending from the left (east) bank of the Vardar at Guevgueli to Kavala.

The Greek Army was concentrated in three main groups from the right (west) bank of the Vardar to Lake Tashino, and beyond, along the coast to the Bay of Leftero.

Greek Offense

The plans were: (1) To drive the Bulgars away from the left bank of the mouth of the Struma and out of the Pravisteh district; to cut the railway from Drama to Seres, which supplied the 2d and 4th Armies, and also to isolate the Bulgarian left wing. (2) To advance their left wing from Guevgueli toward Lake Dojran; to cut the pass leading from Dojran to Strumitca, and thus to interrupt communications between the 2d and 4th Bulgarian Armies.

Bulgarian Defense

The Belasica Mountains, lying north of the lower valleys of the Vardar and Struma, which separate this theater from the valley of the Strumitca, can only be crossed by two passes; one north of Lake Dojran and the other at Rupel, where the Struma emerges from the most wretchedly mountainous country in Macedonia. The only possible retreat towards the Bulgarian frontier for the 2d Army and for the left wing of the 4th Army, which had fallen back into the valley of the Strumitca, as well as the only line of supply for these forces, was through Rupel pass and the valley of the Struma. The possession of both these passes were absolutely necessary to the Bulgars in case of either fight or flight.

General Ivanoff, commanding the 2d Army published the Bulgarian plan in the following order:

1. The left wing will advance, drive the Greeks

to the right (west) bank of the mouth of the Struma and take position with shortened front and holding the left (east) bank at the mouth of the Struma, in order to protect the railroad.

2. The right wing will cross the Vardar at Guevgueli, establish a bridgehead on the west (right) bank and if compelled to retire will destroy the bridge.

These movements were executed and a brigade from the Pravistha district was sent by rail to reinforce the force at Kukus.

The Bulgarian battalion, which had remained in Salonica since the surrender of the Turks, was crushed by the Greeks.

Then on July 3d, the commander of the 2d Army wired to the Commander-in-Chief: "If we are forced to retreat, shall we retire into the valley of the Struma or from Drama?" He was answered: "The task of your army is to secure the flank and the rear of the 4th and 5th Armies; in case of retreat, retire slowly, keeping up energetic resistance, into the valleys of the Struma and the Vardar." There is certainly some evidence in this order to support the contention that the Commander-in-chief did not fully and clearly understand the position of either the 2d or the 4th Army, for there was no chance of escape for either army in the valley of the Vardar and only the 2d Army could have retired from Drama. The assignment to coöperation with the 4th Army, however, determined the valley of the Struma as the line of retreat.

On the following day the Greeks attacked all along the line. On the Bulgarian left, a futile attempt was made to land at Tusla under the protection of gunboats. On the center the Bulgarians were driven back toward the Belasica Mountains, the left center resting on Seres. On the Bulgarian

right, the force holding the Guevgueli bridgehead was driven back and in its hasty retirement the bridge was *not* destroyed. This force, however, retired in good order and took up a position covering the pass leading from Dojran to Strumitca. As an incident illustrating the determined defense of the Bulgarians against overwhelming forces, it may be mentioned that five Greek divisions attacked Colonel Rebavoff's Brigade near Kukus inflicting a loss of seven officers and 500 men. Protecting the retirement of this defeated force, the machine gun detachment of the 32d Nova Zagora Regiment remained in position until all its officers and men were either killed or wounded.

On July the 7th, the Greeks renewed the attack on the Bulgarian right and left, with their original purpose of preventing their enemy's retreat into the valleys of the Strumitca or the Struma. They succeeded, on the right, in crossing to the east bank of the Struma at Seres and interrupting the railroad, but only after all of the wagon trains and artillery of the Bulgarian left wing had been withdrawn towards Rupel Pass. The infantry of the left wing concentrated at Drama and retired into the valley leading to Nevikop. The center withdrew, unmolested, from the Belasica Mountains towards Rupel Pass. The right wing retired toward Strumitca while the brigade of Colonel Kavarvalijev held the pass at Dojran during the day and night with almost a disastrous loss and the death of the commander. The artillery and wagon trains of this right wing were hurried from Strumitca toward Petric, while the brigade was holding its position.

At this same time, the 4th Army had met with serious reverses which forced it back with a separation of the right from the left wing at Istip. The two divisions of the right wing had already retired

with their trains and artillery along the Bregalnitca to Kochina and the other two divisions forming the left wing were withdrawn towards Strumitca, from where the infantry could and did later retire over the mountains in a northeast direction towards Pechova, although the artillery and trains could only escape by a flank march through the valley of the Strumitca, towards Petric, and thence to the valley of the Struma. General Kovatcheff, (Commanding the 4th Army) at this time so feared a catastrophe that he telegraphed General Headquarters urgently recommending intervention, as a means to suspend hostilities "before the fatal hour arrives." He received a very elaborate order directing a movement against the Servians, which had already been attempted with such disastrous results that two of his divisions had sustained a loss of 30 per cent.

The heroic temper of the Commander-in-chief rose sublimely above his appreciation of the situation in the reply to the Commanding Officer of the 4th Army, in which he instructed the latter to place no confidence in intervention but to trust only to the force of arms and "to attack the Greeks energetically and roll up their left wing—or else die in honorable battle. In so sacrificing yourself you will save the 2d Army." General Kovatcheff, (Commanding 4th Army) thought "the idea superb but inopportune" as the infantry on his left wing was then on the way to the upper Bregalnitca, near Pechovo and Carevocelo, and its artillery, except a battalion with the rear guard, and all the wagon trains had gone to the valley of the Struma.

On July 9th, the rear guard brigade. with its artillery and train, as it was in a critical position in the valley of the Strumitca, with the Greeks pressing on the Belasica Mountains, was ordered to march *without halting* to Petric, in order to reach the

Struma valley road. This order was given, notwithstanding the request of the brigade commander for delay on account of the greatly fatigued condition of his men, who had been in continuous operations for two frightfully hot days, clad in winter clothing. In spite of these orders the column halted for the night, but the 2d Army fell back during the night from Belasica Mountain and in the morning, as the march of the brigade was resumed, the Greeks attacked them in flank in superior force and the artillerymen unhooked the horses and abandoned their guns. The infantry retired to the north over the mountains.

Two days later, when General Kovatcheff reached Pechora, he was relieved of his command by the King because he had "lost faith in his army and himself."

In this way both the 2d and 4th Armies were extricated from a most difficult position. With the exception of the lost battalion of artillery, the trains of both armies had been collected from a wide front and sent over the most available road for their escape from lower Macedonia.

When the flank march through the Valley of the Strumitca began, the hospitals at Radovista and Strumitca contained 2,500 sick and wounded of the Fourth Army whose transportation added much to the burden of the retreat. The early interruption of the line of communications by rail, before the more difficult and more tedious route by road was established, left the army with a ration reduced to one half a loaf or one pound of bread.

The Fourth Army was reformed on the Bregalnitca, in front of Caravocelo, with its left flank in contact with the right flank of the 2d Army, which had fallen back through Kresna Pass. This Bulgarian movement prevented a junction of the Servian and Greek armies, as the former was then in

the lower Bregalnitca and the latter in the Struma Valley.

Then, on July 15th, the last straw was added to the almost crushing weight of Bulgarian disaster, when the Roumanian army crossed the Danube and began its march on Sofia, which, under the existing conditions, could be met only by a decision to make no resistance to this advance.

As the Greeks were not moving energetically into the Valley of the Struma, General Ivanhoff prepared for an advance of the 2d Army, even though another menace then confronted the Bulgarians, when one regiment of his right wing was reported to have three fourths of its strength disabled by "gastro-enteritis," which most probably was cholera, as 10,000 cholera cases were later received in evacuation hospitals of the 2d and 4th Armies. General Ivanhoff was not permitted to advance because he was informed the political conditions indicated the continuation of the defensive.

The events of July 24th probably mark the critical stage and the turn of fortune in the Bulgarian campaign, as on this day the Servians made a determined attack and were defeated with great loss (at Banjatchuka, Povijen and Calimanovi) and the 2d Army received strong reënforcements. After this encouragement a strategic retirement of the 2d Army was ordered, with the purpose of drawing the Greeks out of the mountains and into the upper Valley of the Struma beyond Kresna Pass, where the Bulgarians hoped to used their field artillery to better advantage than in the mountains, where the preponderance of Greek mountain guns had given the latter a great advantage in the earlier stages of the campaign. Positions were taken in front of Dzuemaja on both banks of the Struma and

frantic entrenching efforts were exhibited to the Greeks which induced them to advance.

On July 27th the 2d Army was given to General Savoff, who was already in command of the 4th and 5th Armies, and he directed the combined operations against both the Servians and the Greeks. The Bulgarian left wing was then reënforced by the column which came from Sofia by way of Samakov. The left wing of the 4th Army was included in the movement so to form the right wing in the attack which was made against both Greek wings, with the object of enveloping them and the cutting off their retreat. The Greek right was struck in the Valley of the Metza (at Dobninishteh), driven both north (from Nehomija) into Predel Pass and south towards Novokop, with the loss of two guns and the wagon trains which carried the baggage of the officers and the outgoing mail bags of the 7th Greek Division.

This incident may be worthy of passing notice, as some of the letters of the Greek soldiers, which have been published in *fac simile* by the Bulgarian government, are printed in translation in the report of the Carnegie "International Commission for the Investigation of the Balkan Wars," as the expressions of Greek soldiers seem to show the manner in which their campaign was conducted.



The Greek left was attacked with equal success from the Valley of Zlenitca.

On July 30th, when the armistice was announced and the order for cessation of hostilities was most reluctantly given, the Bulgarian line lay in the form of a horseshoe with its center massed at the "toe" (in front of Djumica), the right wing at one "heel" (near Nevokop) and the left wing at the other "heel" (at Pechovo). The main body of the Greek army faced directly against the inside of the "toe."

The Greeks in their retreat, with the center of the 2d Army in pursuit, would have had to have made a longer march than that of the Bulgarian wings in closing in on the only road by which the Greeks could escape.

While this report is taken largely from Bulgarian official reports, I have the personal accounts of Bulgarian officers and of most creditable observers in the person of two German doctors who were battalion surgeons with the troops engaged, and all corroborate some of the related incidents. As it is quite probable that the submerging levels of the "hydrostatic paradox of controversy" may long obscure the historic surface of these events, which have already sunk into insignificance in comparison with the vastly more important military history that is now in making, and as any evidence that may support the Bulgarian account of their own operations may not be out of place, I feel able myself to verify in a general way, at least, some of these incidents, because I arrived on July 24th at Kustendil, the headquarters of General Savoff and of General Tocheff, commanding the 5th Army, just at that time when fortune first seemed to favor Bulgarian arms.

Concerning this day, it may be remembered, two critical events are recorded: one was what the Bulgarians called their "success against the Servians," and the other was the timely reënforcement of the 2d Army. The effect of these two fortunate incidents had not then been felt at Kustendil. On that same day the order of the day before for the evacuation of the hospitals was then being executed as the preliminary step to the evacuation of the town, the Valley of the Struma and the withdrawal of the 5th Army from the frontier to the defile through which the river emerges, a few miles east of town, in its course from Sofia. The daily in-

creasing number of trench-line scars could be seen on the mountain sides. The whole situation was one of military activity under the strain of a stern resignation, moaning laments and bitter accusations of responsibility for the "ruin of Bulgaria." Unbroken lines of bullock wagons were creaking night and day on the road to Carovocelo and to the 4th Army with ammunition and supplies. They were returning as regularly with wounded—a thousand in the first day of my service and from three to five hundred daily for several days after.

The 2d Army was based on Dubnitca—Sofia and I knew nothing personally of that line.

Regiments marched through the town at night, but in what numbers I did not know. Artillery was detrained and rattled off to Carovocelo. I saw as many as a dozen guns on the way. Cafés were closed, and gendarmes, such as there were—grizzled and stooped old men in sheepskin coats carrying obsolete arms—ordered the dispersion of the groups that gathered in the streets to talk with great interest about something. The next day the coffee-houses were opened; the following day they were closed again, and I then learned that the coffee-house was the barometer of public tension, as the commanding general ordered them closed when there was any unhappy or disquieting rumors in circulation, and then "lifted the lid" when the news was good.

On the second day before the armistice the barometer was away up; the "lid was off;" the coffee-houses were open and almost everybody was recklessly ordering the second and even third cup of coffee at one sitting. My colleague let me into the secret; he told me of the "great success" that the Bulgars were about to attain in the capture of the Greek army, as it was *then* almost surrounded and

there were sufficient troops available to complete the movement.

Then I saw the outbursts of indignation and heard the protests of injustice and wails of despair when the announcement of the armistice cut short the campaign and denied to the Bulgars the few days necessary to their confidently expected achievement. I heard the commanding general of an army utter his *"miserables"* and other more impressive though less intelligible expressions which must have done him a great deal more good. There could have been no doubt to any one there in Kustendil that the Bulgars on the 24th day of July feared they had lost their campaign and that on July 30th they were wholly confident that they had won it. Besides, there is at least one historical fact which supports their position. The King of Greece *did* telegraph the King of Roumania on July 30th demanding an "immediate" armistice, and the King of Roumania, with his army then within a few miles of Sofia, *did* enforce the Greek demand upon Bulgaria and compelled her to accept the armistice just as she was about to capture the Greek army.

Three commanders of this war, Generals Savoff, Ivanhoff and Dimitrieff, have been variously and vigorously traduced for the disaster they are said to have brought to Bulgarian arms, although it does seem that each one of them has escaped with a few shreds of reputation, because General Savoff was sent as the Bulgarian plenipotentiary to negotiate the treaty with Turkey, General Ivanhoff was decorated by the King with an order so high that the King himself was the only other member, and General Dimitrieff has gone to command a Russian division in a greater war.

But in the advantages she has taken of the possibilities for controversy in placing the responsi-

bility for her defeat, Bulgaria has shown to the world an appreciation as keen as that of other enlightened nations for making the most of these rich opportunities for excitement which come as the aftermath of war.



Fourth Lecture

NOTES ON THE BALKAN AND TURKISH ARMIES

Strength

THE population of Bulgaria is about four and one-fourth million. The peace footing of the army is about 60,000 which is raised to war strength by the addition of trained reserves, provided for in cadres of 200,000, which are increased by additional calls to 300,000, or an extreme limit of 400,000, so that one-tenth of the population is normally available for military service, as more than this number were under arms during the last war.

The population of Servia is about three million. The peace strength of the army is about 30,000, with a provision for war strength of 200,000.

Montenegro, with a population of only 250,000, exacts military service from every male, who is big enough to carry a gun and not too old to climb a mountain. They had under arms from 45,000 to 50,000 in the last war which shows that they contributed one fifth of their population, which is, no doubt, the factor of extreme limit in the military strength of any people.

The population of Turkey is at present, and always has been unknown. It has been given as about twenty-four million. Foreign officials living in Turkey have not been able to make the estimate so high. I have been told by those in a position to know, in Constantinople, that, considering the territorial losses

Turkey has sustained in the last few years, the population at present is about fourteen million. Before the first war Turkey had under arms 300,000 men, which represented her standing army, but they were standing around over such a widely dispersed area that she did not have at the beginning of the war that many regular troops in action. The practical limit of her effective military strength is probably about 500,000. Prior to 1909 only Moslems were eligible for military service, but after that time all Ottoman subjects became amenable to conscription. The Christian contingent was not added to the army at once, but 25% was taken each year, and the precaution was invariably observed to send the Christian recruits to stations farthest from their homes.

At the beginning of the Balkan Wars the allied armies at first numbered about 625,000. The Turkish Nizam and Redifs together numbered 300,000. During the course of the war the allies had under arms about 800,000 and the Turks 600,000.

Organization

In the Balkan and Turkish armies the military unit of strength is the battalion, and in all except the Turkish armies the normal strength of the battalion is 1,000 rifles. The larger Bulgarian units were brigades, divisions and armies. The Serbs did not employ the brigade, while the Turks divided their armies into corps and divisions without brigades. The Bulgarian infantry regiment consisted of four battalions of four companies of 250 rifles each and a few unarmed men, and the regiment was considered as carrying 4,000 rifles, and drawing 5,000 rations. Two regiments comprised the brigade, and three brigades the division, or twenty-four battalions. The Bulgarian cavalry did not seem to be of much efficiency or very well trained and it was poorly

mounted. The squadron consisted of about 200 men, and there were four of them to the regiment, and ten regiments in the army. The artillery was of two classes, the modern Schneider-Cruesot quick firing guns of 7.5 cm., with three battalions of three batteries of four guns each, or 36 guns. The older matériel was the Krupp 7.5 and 8.7 cm. non-quick firing guns, formed in two battalions of three batteries of four guns each, or twenty-four guns.

The Servian infantry units were the same as the Bulgarian, but their companies were divided into tenths. They did not employ the brigade formation but their division consisted of four regiments, or sixteen battalions. Their cavalry was organized like the Bulgarian, and they had the same number, ten regiments. The peace footing was only five regiments, but soldiers taken from the reserves who "loved horses" made up the extra units. The Servian artillery was of modern Schneider-Cruesot 7.5, 8, 12 and 15 cm. The field regiments consisted of three battalions of three batteries, of four guns each.

The Montenegrin infantry was about the same as the Servian, but the artillery was made up of rich and rare varieties of ordnance, as the most of their pieces had been presented to the King.

The Turkish infantry regiments consisted of three battalions of three companies, 500 men to the battalion, or 1,500 to the regiment. The cavalry organization consisted of four squadrons of 100 to 125 men each, approximately 500 men to the regiment. This arm was poorly organized and trained and was badly mounted. It was largely used as a remount service for mounted officers who were unable to provide their own horses, and the most of the officers seem to have been mounted in this way. The German instructors had tried to introduce into the

cavalry organization that superior social caste that it found in some of the crack cavalry organizations in Western Europe.

An example of this spirit may be found in a regiment of lancers that had permanent station at Constantinople, and was commanded by a German cavalry officer of great energy, who devoted his efforts largely to establish the social caste of this organization, in teaching the officers the graceful and easy manners of the Cafe habitue' and fox hunter. He met with some difficulty as the social system of the country did not make it easy for the Turkish officers to take their proper place among the membership of the hunting clubs. However, the unhappy day came when this regiment went to war. Some months after when a lady in diplomatic circles asked this German commander of the 1st Constantinople Lancers what had become of his regiment and how he was then occupying his time, he replied that his regiment was engaged at the battle of Luli Burgas where he had hoped they might render some service to the cause of the Sultan, but something had happened that not only led to its disorganization but to its complete disappearance.

The Turkish artillery, of Krupp material and about one-half modern, was poorly handled and rendered inefficient service. The difficulty of developing an efficient artillery service in the Turkish army is almost insurmountable, owing to the scarcity of soldiers who have enough elementary education and mechanical competency to enable them to be trained into gunners. Some of their batteries show rather good form in the way of superficial manifestation at drill and maneuvers, but the more technical accomplishments seem to be quite lacking.

Mobilization

The mobilization of the allied armies was carried out promptly and effectively and all the cadres were regularly filled at the time the war began.

The Turkish Army, however, was mobilized in disorder and confusion. In the effort to increase the strength of regular organizations by their reserves, some of the Nizam, or regular regiments, were filled with more reserves, or untrained recruits, than regulars. There were no reserve lists prepared, and when mobilization was ordered and reserves called out, these reservists were assembled with recruits without classification. The military authorities sent requisitions to certain villages for their contributions of men and the gendarmerie rounded up in various communities the numbers that the head man was ordered to supply. There was very little, if any, efficient physical examination and the results of this omission were very evident in the hospital service at Constantinople, where all sorts of physical defects were gathered for ultimate elimination. I terminated my medical service there with a series of operations for hernia which ranged in size from oranges to watermelons. The reservists and recruits, gathered at concentration centers, were subjected to most trying forms of neglect. They were oftimes provided with no shelter, and remained literally out in the rain for days, and in some instances were partly if not wholly starved before joining their organizations.

The Bulgarian and Turkish Soldier

Citizenry

As the qualities of the soldier depend to such a great extent upon his condition as a citizen, the ma-

terial that Bulgaria found in her citizenry to form her army, may be best presented by a few quotations from a description of the Bulgarian people, written some years ago by an author well qualified to discuss the subjects, under the title of "Bulgaria: The Peasant State."

"The Bulgarians are not an engaging or attractive people; they have no literature, no artistic taste, no intellectual culture, and no dramatic qualities; they are simply a race of peasants with all the peasant's meanness, but with also all the peasant's virtues of industry and frugality. They live roughly, thriftily, and one might say sordidly, but they have sufficient to eat; they are warmly if coarsely clothed, and they enjoy a certain amount of rude comfort. They work hard but they work for themselves. Poverty in our sense does not exist. There are no labor troubles and no strikes, no conflicting interests of workmen and employers—thanks to themselves. If you want work done in Bulgaria you can get it done more cheaply if you employ Bulgarian workmen by the day rather than for the job or by piece work. Under the exterior of the peasant, cunning and superstitious, in accordance with peasant nature, the common Bulgarian conceals a shrewd and observant mind."

Every Bulgarian has two passions; that of sex and that for land. No Bulgarian swain has the effrontery to ask the father for the hand of his daughter if he cannot base his claim upon possession of some property. It is his ambition to own a farm. It is a greater offense to the Bulgarian peasant to trespass upon his land than on his person.

The Turk, on the other hand, exhibits a different social system. He has two extreme classes—the Pashas and the peasants. There is no middle class, but its void is filled by functionaries, or office-holders, as almost every public office in the Ottoman Empire is held by a Turk. The administration of the government is based largely upon the principle of creating sufficient public places to employ the Turkish civil army of occupation. The Pashas are the administra-

tors or gentlemen pensioners living in some way on the revenues of the government. The peasants are the lowliest social order and exist in a primitive state of poverty and abject humility. They seldom own property and are almost always tenants of the land they till. They feel that they exist by sufferance of some illustrious person who holds their lives in his hands. But few of them can read and they show no other disposition than that humble desire of being simply permitted to live. They seldom go far from their villages and the recruits presented a pathetic aspect as they entered Constantinople in droves, timidly holding each others hands, but wholly resigned to their unknown fate.

Military Training

The Turk serves nominally three years with the colors, but virtually they are dismissed when the military authorities find it convenient, and many of them serve much longer. Much of their service is garrison duty where they are stationed to preserve the authority of the empire. In late years, under German instruction, there has been all sorts of educational schemes devised for the benefit of both officers and soldiers, but the method has been better suited to German society, as it has developed a sense of superiority on the part of the officer, which has led him to keep aloof from the men, to the extent of taking no part in their instruction, which is done entirely by non-commissioned officers. The organization of the army under German instruction has taken away that class of company officers who used to control the company as a head man rules his village, but the new system has not developed a satisfactory substitute for what it removed.

The Bulgar, on the other hand, has taken his

military training very seriously and always with a deep personal interest. The two years he spends with the colors in the infantry, and the three years in mounted and other services, together with subsequent periods of instruction, makes him a competent soldier. By attaining certain merit in his course of instruction he may shorten the period of two years to eighteen months, and that of three years to thirty months.

Endurance

The endurance of the Eastern soldier is his greatest characteristic, both as regards hardships and patience. The Turkish soldier is a particularly patient creature, and one should never do him the injustice to even think of him as "terrible." His waiting capacity is admirable, as while he waits he does not have to be watched. He will wait in the rain, in the cold, without food, and without question—after he has been told to do so. I have seen hundreds of them in the public square and streets of the village, which was the cholera camp, where the houses had been vacated by their tennants who fled in terror. These soldiers were forbidden to trespass upon the property of the village, and many of them died from the mere want of shelter without breaking a window pane. In one dooryard, in which there was a well, I saw a group of plainly sick soldiers struggling for water, but they had been driven to this infraction of discipline by abnormal thirst. One half-delirious soldier did threaten an attack on a front gate, but a non-commissioned officer drew a pistol and he staggered back to the gutter.

When the Bulgarian soldier waits he must be watched, for he wants to know what it is all about—what he is waiting for, and, most probably, what he is going to do next; but when it comes to sheer

physical exertion, his qualities are not much less than superb, and his superior is hard to find.

I have a story of a Bulgarian march that may furnish an illustration, as it was told by the regimental apothecary, who accompanied the column on foot throughout the march. A regiment of about 5,000 men had fought three days at Adrianople, with a loss of killed and wounded of 302, when it was ordered, with a battery of artillery, to proceed in all haste to the Chatalja line, some 150 miles distant. The march was begun immediately, and continued literally night and day for eleven days; the men slept at night only when the pioneers were making roads for the artillery. Each day the progress was from twelve to twenty miles, though one day on good roads a march of twenty-five miles was made. The average night's march was from a mile to a mile and a half. The column arrived four days in advance of the wagon train, during which time the men were issued no rations, and their only subsistence, during these four days, was the uncooked wheat or corn which they found in the villages. Two days after the arrival of the wagon train, the first fresh meat was received, in the form of goats, which could be driven faster than sheep, and thus was made to form the component of an emergency ration, which in this instance at least put the despised and usually delinquent goat in the first place. The apothecary said that everything went well, except for one terrible infraction upon discipline, which occasioned the loss of three loaves of bread which he and the doctor had sequestered in the ambulance cart.

Incidentally, cholera began its invasion about this time, as all the Bulgarian troops in that position suffered from lack of commissary supplies. Eight thousand deaths in the Bulgarian troops followed in

the ensuing weeks. This epidemic was a considerable factor in preventing the success of the Bulgarian attack, which was made about two weeks after this time.

The Officers' Corps---Proportion to Soldiers

In the Bulgarian permanent establishment there were 2,670 officers and 60,000 enlisted men. As the army was to be increased in time of war to 300,000, a provision was made for the production of reserve officers by establishing an academy for reserve cadets in Sofia. As conscription is universal, an option on taking this course is given to men of certain educational qualifications, who can pass an examination in one year. Upon passing a final examination, the cadet attains the status of a reserve officer of a certain grade, but if he fails he has to complete his military service in the ordinary way. The training of reserve officers in this way has been most highly commended by military observers.

In the Servian army there are 2,050 officers and 30,000 men in the regular establishment, which makes about the same number of officers to about half the number of men as in the Bulgarian army. The Servians had no academy for reserve cadets, but produced their reserve officers by promotion of non-commissioned officers from the regular service.

The Turks had no system of providing reserve officers, and the result was an awful shortage of officers in all their organizations, after their army was mobilized.

Physique

Physically the Bulgarian officer is a pretty good hardy specimen, the most of them rather short, stocky and dark, but a number are of the Russian type, rather tall, robust and blond. The Turkish officers as

a class are certainly physically inferior to the Bulgarian. While their physical proportions in many instances are superb, they are generally anaemic, and looked as though they had been accustomed to indoor rather than outdoor life.

Education and Training

The Bulgarian officers are home-made at their military academy in Sofia by a course of two years, which is followed by six months service before they are commissioned. They are eligible for admission to the academy between the ages of 16 and 21. There is a system of honors and distinctions to be attained in the course, upon which is based certain subsequent educational opportunities at home and abroad. Quite a number of them are sent each year to take military courses in Russia, Italy and France, and such officers as successfully complete their studies abroad enter a preferred class to which advancement comes more readily than to others, and they wear always as part of their uniform a distinctive badge, which indicates the character of their foreign military education.

The Turks have a military academy in Constantinople, but the cadet's course was affected by so many elements of political and social favoritism, that no military educational system of any real worth existed. Many young officers are sent abroad, but they are usually selected on political or family grounds, and when they return to their own service, their subsequent military careers are largely affected by the same factors.

Relation to Soldiers

The relation of the Bulgarian officer to the soldier, is based upon the principles of stern discipline, but bears no evidence of assumption of personal su-

periority, and shows no glaring mark of class distinction. Soldiers are particularly respectful and readily obedient in the discharge of their duties and in the endurance of hardships, but they seem to bear no pious regard for the sacred personality of the officer. During the progress of the Second War, I was riding on a troop train, comfortably installed in the first class compartment of a car, the roof of which was filled to its capacity with soldiers on the way to join their regiments. The soldiers maintained a somewhat frivolous enthusiasm, by an almost continuous fusillade, while the train was waiting at the station. It soon became manifest that there was an element of danger to anybody who appeared in the immediate or somewhat remote vicinity. An officer standing on the ground, gave the order to "cease firing", which was only very imperfectly executed. He then mounted the roof of the car, and while he went around among the men and instructed them individually, they obeyed his order while he was standing near them and treated him with due respect, but they continued to fire occasional joyousness after he had passed on and until the train started.

The Turkish officer on the other hand, bears an entirely different relation to the Turkish soldier. Everything about his attitude is one of personal superiority and absolute control of life and limb. He does not hesitate after the first loud words of admonition, reproach and certain hyperbolical forms of most terrible threats, to strike the soldier on the cheek with his open hand or, if the form has a little more military character, he uses the flat of his saber.

I have seen a Military Pasha call on the carpet a non-commissioned officer, with whom I had something to do and, after storming about in a most frantic way, announce that he was at that time suffering the last drain upon his patience, and that on the very next

occasion for reproval, he would gouge out the soldier's eyes. Then, to be more impressive, he assumed a dramatic attitude, extending the two separated fingers of his right hand with a hooking gesture toward the soldier's eyes which indicated quite clearly the process he intended to employ. As a fit climax to the whole proceeding, after the soldier had faced about and was near the door, the Pasha, lowering his voice to a tone that was almost gentle, called the soldier back to make another reference to the penalty with which he was threatened. The soldier was informed that the Pasha had forgotten to tell him that, if the occasion arose, the Pasha would take particular delight in executing personally this summary sentence. When the soldier had finally withdrawn, His Excellency turned to me in the gentlest manner and said with a little smile, that he had just shown me the best way to observe discipline. He also remarked that the Turkish soldiers were so dense and stupid and bestial that only such methods were effective. I have seen too many instances of this same method of discipline to be mistaken about its customary employment.

Promotion

Bulgarian officers, except for special preference based upon educational qualifications, are promoted by seniority with an age limit retirement, as follows:

Captains retire at	48
Majors " "	52
Lt-Colonels " "	55
Colonels " "	58
General officers retire at	65

The promotion of Turkish officers can hardly be fairly considered unless it is taken in relation with that other process which affects so frequently their

careers, namely, demotion. They have, however, a scheme of promotion by seniority, and age limit retirement, under which second lieutenants retire at 41, and Field Marshals at 68. Whatever may be the effect of this penalty upon officers, it is conventionally modified by the gentle and sympathetic process of administration. Pensions are very small, but they are eternally enduring, and often descend from one generation to another.

The retrograde progress sometimes made by Turkish officers, even those of distinction, will be indicated by a story or two concerning individuals whose names are associated with recent events.

Nazim Pasha had been minister of war for less than a year before his assassination. Before he came into that office he had only recently returned to the active practice of his chosen profession, as Abdul Hamid some years before had sent him to Bagdad, where he carried a hod for a bricklayer for a period of years. A prominent foreign official told me he would always regard Nazim's death as untimely, because he believed so much in his gentle and appreciative disposition that he thought that had Nazim lived for the requisite number of years he would have repaid a little loan that this foreign official extended to him about the time he returned from Bagdad. The official was crossing the Floating Bridge, which is the Rialto of Constantinople, when he was accosted by a ragged and unkempt individual who addressed him in familiar and almost affectionate terms. After a more careful inspection, he recognized in the stranger the familiar features and personality of his erstwhile friend Nazim. The latter told the official of his arrival just that day in Constantinople from the enforced and fatiguing sojourn in far off Bagdad. But as he had not only returned to the Mecca of the Europeanized Turk, but to his former rank in the

army, it seemed incumbent upon him to provide himself with the outward evidence of his position. The official loaned Nazim $40.00 with which Nazim thought he would be able to purchase the uniform of a general of brigade which he was expected to wear. Although some years had passed since that time, and Nazim had repaid the loan, under pressure of subsequent circumstances he had again negotiated it, and the official felt that had sufficient years been allotted in Nazim's career, the loan would finally have been discharged.

After Nazim's assassination he was succeeded by Izzet Pasha as Generalissimo. Izzet, in his day had suffered some of the inconveniences of demotion that had befallen Nazim, and was sent away from Constantinople by Abdul Hamid for station in Damascus, where his duties confined him to a rock pile. It seems that while Izzet, in his early career, was the Türkish military *attaché* in Berlin, the Kaiser knew him favorably and well. Not many years ago, while on a visit to the Sultan, the Kaiser mentioned Izzet's name to a friend of the latter, and it was revealed to the Kaiser that Izzet was then cracking rock in Damascus, in compliance with the Sultan's express wishes. Izzet's friend suggested to the Kaiser that he make a casual but interested inquiry of the Sultan as to the whereabouts of the attractive young Ottoman officer whom he had known while attached to the Sultan's embassy in Berlin. The Sultan regretted that this distinguished officer was absent on a somewhat prolonged tour of duty in a part of the empire so remote as Damascus. Later during his tour the Kaiser reached Damascus, where he was greeted by the official representative of the Sultan in the person of Izzet Pasha, as a general of brigade, although this high dignitary of the hour had been but a colonel at the time he had incurred

the displeasure and distrust of the Sultan which sent him in disgrace to Damascus.

General Staff

The Bulgarian General Staff is a very carefully selected military hierarchy. Only officers who have graduated from the military schools of Russia, Italy and France are eligible to detail, and then their subsequent advancement is determined by their service and efficiency records. They return while in the lower grades for periods of service with troops, and many of them, when they attain advanced rank, come into command of higher units.

The Turkish General Staff is a very exclusive body, selected nominally on the educational attainments of the officer and his training in foreign schools and armies, but the usual conditions which affect all Turkish administration, that of favoritism and family influences, obtains in this branch of the Turkish army. Whatever may be the regulations governing officers of the general staff, the fact is that when once established in this preferred situation, they lose contact with troops and have little or no field service. Whatever individual accomplishments some of these officers possess, they were unable to exhibit them in their late opportunities.

Supply Service

There is no special corps of Bulgarian supply officers. Details are made from the line after three years' service with troops followed by a course in a special school in Sofia. With every division there is an officer of the Intendance Department. He sometimes has some junior officer assistants, but most of the work is done by civilians. What system there is in the Turkish army I do not clearly understand,

except that the principle is German and the application is Turkish. But one can be morally certain that the same elements of favoritism and personal relation determines the details to the supply service.

Pay

The soldier's pay in all Eastern armies is hardly munificent enough to create the habits of a spendthrift; in fact, the schedule seems to be carefully based on a principle which sturdily encourages the virtue of frugality. The Bulgarian soldier is paid $0.20 a month, and the Servian soldier receives $0.30, while the rate of pay for the Turkish soldier is $0.90 a month. One might think that the Turk is overpaid as a warrior, but he is not. His munificent stipend is only promised, and he seldom gets it. Sometimes his fortune fares well, as it did while the army was assembled on the Chatalja line, for then he received his pay regularly, as it was necessary to sweeten his disposition and suppress his inclination to interest himself in politics. When I left Constantinople, the civil list was six months behind in its payment.

Clothing

The color of the Bulgarian soldier's uniform is hard to describe as it is something of a mixture of gray and red. It has nothing of the drab or olive shade, but might be called a brownish gray; a solid color, about as dark in its density as olive drab. It looks much the same from a distance and affords about the same advantage of invisibility. There is a collar and cuff facing indicating the various arms of the service. The blouse is of the ordinary military form, with dark buttons and standing collar. The trousers are of the same material as the blouse, baggy at the knees, without cut to conform to the calf of the leg. The officers wear olive drab very similar to

our own service uniform, but somewhat lighter and a little more of the fawn color, with a very conspicuous shoulder strap. Both the Turkish officers and soldiers wear the English service olive drab made by an English firm in Smyrna, of very good woolen cloth of domestic manufacture.

Head Dress

The Bulgarian officer and soldier and every other official in Bulgaria wears, ever and always without exception, the Russian cap.

The Turkish soldier is somewhat hampered by his religious tenets in the selection of suitable headdress for campaign, as the Mohammedan must wear on his head some sort of a device that has no rim or visor to prevent him from making his prayers by touching his forehead to the carpet. As a Moslem wears a fez in civil life, and wears it all the time, indoors or out, asleep or awake, when he becomes a soldier he must wear a head gear that will enable him to observe these conditions.

Formerly the Turkish army wore the familiar red fez with a black tassel, but when the army was reformed some years ago and put into olive drab, the red fez was changed to the same color. Later another device was adopted, which gave better service in campaign, and was made of the same grayish material as the overcoat. This device, which most of the Turkish soldiers wore in the late war, was based in construction on the principle of the turban which enabled it to conform to religious requirements. It consisted of a hood, much like that of our military overcoat with very long ear-laps which are conventionally worn wrapped around the head, but which, for purposes of protection, were lowered and wrapped around the neck.

Footwear

The most interesting and important element of the clothing of both the Bulgarian and the Turkish armies, was the footwear. The Bulgarian peasant wore a combination of layers of felt in larger or smaller pieces, wrapped around his feet and legs, with the sole of the foot covered with a rawhide sandal, which combination he calls an "opanken." This device was employed almost exclusively by the foot troops of the Bulgarian army, although the mounted troops were furnished boots. In their regular military service the boot is part of the uniform of all the mounted soldiers but there seemed to be a scarcity of supply in the Second War. The soldiers who came from villages displayed their urbanity by showing a preference for boots to the "opanken." The peasants who regularly wore this footgear were very well pleased with it as it had many advantages. The layers of wrapping could be increased to suit conditions of winter weather, although it afforded no protection against the wet. There was a compensation in this disadvantage, however, because if the soldier's feet became wet, and he had a chance to seek shelter, he could dry them at once by inverting the cloth and wrapping around his foot the dry portion, that had served as a legging, so as to permit the portion that had become wet to dry by evaporation when wrapped around the calf. But the greatest advantage this footwear had served was the preparation of the Bulgarian for military service by saving his feet from the deforming influence of modern shoes. As a class the feet of the Bulgarians were absolutely normal.

The Turkish army, in its reformation, had adopted as a uniform shoe, a low brogan of the type of former issues in our own service with which an olive drab woolen puttee leggin was worn. This imposed something of a very marked departure from the ordi-

nary habits of the Turkish peasant, whose footgear conformed to Oriental requirements. The Oriental's normal state is an indoor one in which he wears no shoes. When he goes out of doors he slips on a temporary foot covering, much as a lady, who goes out to a party in winter time, covers her slippers with goloshes. So, when the Turk has to adopt a footgear for continuous out-of-door service, he is a bit out of his element. The Turkish soldier simply loves slippers and when he reverts to them with his puttee leggings it makes rather a weird combination.

Rations

The Bulgarian ration when written on paper is all right in every element of food value. You may be satisfied to know that it consists of nine well-balanced components, with sufficient fuel value to meet the physiological demands of able-bodied soldiers engaged in a hard day's work. The provision for making substitutions can be so arranged that it compares favorably with the ration of an American soldier. No doubt, in time of peace, this ration is supplied, or at least as much of it as the Bulgarian soldier wishes to eat, but in time of war all that it promises to the dietary of the soldier is not fulfilled. But with all its shortcomings the soldier does not feel that he has been cheated so long as he is supplied with bread.

In civil life the peasant's principal ration component is bread of a very good quality, and very ample quantity, supplemented by a meaty element usually in a form of cheese, but occasionally in the form of real meat. When he gets meat it is almost invariably mutton. When the peasant is enduring military service he never expects a bit more than he gets at home, and is satisfied with less. The hungry soldier without food, when he makes inquiry about his expected ration, only uses the word "bread", for

this is all he actually demands, although whenever a favorable opportunity offers he is sometimes bold enough to expect cheese or meat. The meat comes to him in form of mutton on the hoof, and he always understands the difficulties of producing this article of diet when it is not forthcoming. If his bread is ample, he does not complain. When the fortunes of war favor him and he has something like his full ration, and a reasonable chance to expect a little recreation, he does not seek it in alcoholic relaxation, but searches for peppers and onions with which to satiate that longing for stimulation that so many other people find in alcohol.

I saw hundreds of Bulgarian soldiers during the time of demobilization, when they were free to roam about the town and seek some form of recreation contrasting with the hardships which they had just escaped on the actual battle line. They did not celebrate by a method with which we are so familiar, that involves the saloon as a necessary element, but they were seen about the market buying peppers and onions and garlic, and preparing individual messes brought up to their own delectable culinary standard by the addition of these savory elements. In Kustendil as many as 40,000 men passed through that town and I saw only one drunken Bulgarian soldier. Perhaps "drunk" is too severe a term to apply to him, for he was only pleasantly enough intoxicated to recognize me, as I was about to pass him on a narrow path, with a very precise military salute, and to show his willingness to allow me the right of way by jumping into a mud puddle.

The ration of the Turkish soldier, as set down on paper, is copied from the German army, with a few local flourishes added which promises the soldier some of the particular components he likes the most, but which the Germans do not care about. The

sanitary inspector of the army at Chatalja told me with great assurance and with apparent satisfaction that the ration of the Turkish army had a greater calorific value than that of any other European army. In practice, however, there was little more ever found in the Turkish soldier's mess than bread and mutton, but under very favorable conditions some vegetables were added which permitted the meat to be rendered in the form of a delectable stew. The Turkish peasant's principal element of food is bread, although he consumes a great deal of rice. Perhaps a form of rice cooked with meat and condiments, which is called "pilaf," together with a peculiarly curdled milk called "yourgert," is the customary diet of the Turkish peasant. At home, both the Turkish and Bulgarian peasants have but one hot or cooked meal each day and that is served about noon. The day is begun with a cup of tea or coffee, with a permissible addition of bread and cheese, and is ended usually with bread alone. I have seen this diet prepared regularly in a Turkish hospital for six months.

Kitchens

The Bulgarian army was equipped with a limited number of portable kitchens of the Austrian army type, with a capacity of about 250 men per wagon. I saw only one of these, but it seemed to be a very satisfactory device, and it might well be employed in some form in our own service.

At the beginning of the war it is said the Turkish army was extravagantly supplied with all sorts of appliances that any agent of military goods in Europe had to sell them. The purchasing officers had been very much attracted by the liberal commissions the European dealers were able to offer, and they devoted a great deal of energy to their

purchases. The army had all the mechanical devices, in some quantity, that any army had ever used. Among other things they had field bakeries. Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha, to whose campaign in Thrace I have referred, accounts for two field bakeries in his train at the beginning of the campagin.

The Bulgarian kitchens in the field were very simple. Each company was supplied with three large and one small soup kettles; the latter were used for company, platoon and squad messing, and the larger vessels were employed when a company mess was conducted. Two of the two larger copper kettles were of the conventional wash boiler type, and they were used on pack animals to carry the mess, which was always prepared in the form of a stew, for the troops when they were in an advanced position and it was necessary to set up the kitchen in the rear. I saw one Bulgarian kitchen down in the valley where water and wood were available, which prepared the mess for a regiment that was in position on a mountain crest about a mile or a mile and a half away, and from there the stew was carried up to the troops once a day on pack animals.

The Turkish field kitchens which I saw on the Chatalja line would hardly be identified as such by one whose military observations had been confined to an experience with American troops. There was frequently no shelter more than a small tent or shack for stores, and a cauldron or two placed in the ground so that wood could be burnt under them. At mess time the small copper pots were brought from companies for the food to be issued to the squads. The Turkish soldier carried a wooden spoon, the handle of which was stuck into the top of his puttee legging, so that it was always under his eye and ready for instant service.

I saw a Bulgarian field bakery at Kustendil

which illustrates the manner in which the Bulgarians handle their food problem in the field. As they have no equipment of this kind that pretends in any way to be portable, the bakery was set up out of material that was found in the town with the employment of the skilled laborers of the locality and but little assistance from the supply department of the army. It consisted of a rough shed twenty feet wide and 150 feet long, along one side of which was built twelve brick ovens about ten by fifteen feet. The floor of the ovens was laid on the ground and trenches were dug in front of the ovens for the bakers to stand in. There were two troughs provided for each oven, and racks were erected at the side of each oven to hold the loaves of dough until they were ready to be baked. One qualified baker was assigned to each oven and all the other personnel were ordinary details from the troops. There were two non-commissioned officers in charge, one of whom, in this particular case, was a gentleman of some educational qualifications. He was a graduate of the University of Brussels, and had intended to return for a course in political economy. It was he who gave me the data. The personnel numbered 168. They worked in night and day shifts. The proper number of men were assigned to assist the baker at each oven, the baker acting only as superintendent in the preparation of the dough, all the manual work being done by the baker's assistants; but he personally attended to the firing of the oven and the actual baking of the bread. The dough was carefully weighed to make a loaf of one kilogram. This was the ration for one day. No pans were used. The bread was transferred from the troughs to the ovens on boards, and then placed on the brick floor of the oven for baking. The ovens were fired eight times in twenty-four hours. At the



BULGARIAN FIELD BAKERY

Made at Army Service Schools.

time of my visit the plant was running at more than 25,000 two-pound loaves per day. It had an ordinary daily capacity of 35,000 loaves, which could have been increased under pressure. It took three or four hours from dough to bread. The bakery was constructed in five days.

The Bulgarians also used hardtack in about the form in which we know it, which they called military biscuit. Six of these were tied in a bundle and sealed with a red seal, providing an emergency ration which could only be opened by the soldier on special and specific orders. Every Bulgarian town has a village bakery as no Bulgarian family bakes its own bread. They find it too expensive, as the fuel economy is greater in community baking. The troops in marching depend largely on the baking facilities of the villages when they do not construct special field bakeries. I saw many of the village bakeries making hard bread. It seemed to be an art that most of the Bulgarian bakers were skilled at. Many of the bakeries in the villages were left in the hands of women, who seemed able to conduct them with great energy and efficiency in the absence of their husbands.

Arms---The Rifle

The rifle of the Bulgarians was the Mannlicher of 8 mm. caliber. The Servian rifle was a Mauser of 7 mm. caliber. The Greek rifle was a Mannlicher of 6.5 mm. caliber. These small arms used a blunt or ogival projectile, the difference in caliber being sufficient to be distinguished by careful comparison. The Turkish army was equipped with the Mauser of 7 mm. caliber. The projectile was different from the others in that it had a sharp nose. It seemed to be the consensus of opinion that the sharp nosed bullet, under certain ballistic conditions, caused the more humane wound on account of its smaller puncture

but, as its center of gravity in much nearer the base than in the blunt pointed bullet, it had a disposition to tumble more readily under certain conditions, thereby making a much more mutilating wound.

Bayonet

The Bulgarian bayonet was of the short type. The experience of the Bulgars in the late wars has satisfactorily confirmed their judgment in the selection of a short rather than a long bayonet. They do not believe that there is any advantage in the reach of a longer arm, and they are convinced that the sturdiness and leverage qualities of the short bayonet makes it superior. The Bulgarians always preferred to fix bayonets before going into action, as they feared the loss of time and the insecurity of attachment, if bayonets were fixed after firing began.

The Turkish bayonet was quite long, but I think it must have been of some advantage to the morale of the Turkish soldier, in that it made him feel that he had that much advantage over the Bulgarian. I don't know what the Turkish ordnance experts think of this equipment after their late experience.

Ammunition

The Bulgarian soldier carried 150 rounds of ammunition in leather boxes on the belt, (two in front and one behind), and in the haversack. There were 30 rounds in each of the two boxes in front, 40 rounds in the box behind, and 50 in the haversack. There were 50 rounds on pack animals, and 100 in the division train, making 300 rounds per man in all.

The Servian soldier carried 135 rounds on his person, 60 in the ammunition wagon and 100 in the division park; 295 in all.

The Turkish soldier carried 150 rounds on his person. The army was provided with a great number

of battalion ammunition wagons of German type, of light structure, short coupled, with a body in the form of a large box, with compartments to hold the ammunition in baskets. They were to be drawn by horses, but were not employed on account of the scarcity of these animals. In Constantinople, during the war, there were several arsenals and depots, in which hundreds of these wagons could be seen parked. Bullock carts were used in the field, instead of this specially designed equipment.

Equipment

Pack

I do not know what the Field Service Regulations prescribed in the way of the composition of the soldier's pack in any of the armies. I saw a lot of Turkish, a lot of Bulgarian, and a lot of Servian soldiers in heavy marching order, and there is not much difference in the appearance of the pack. They appeared to prefer the blanket roll, and they were all normally supplied with blankets. The Turks and Bulgarians carried a haversack much like that of our old infantry equipment, and the Servian soldiers in addition carried knapsacks. All carried the canteen. The Bulgarian used his haversack largely for his food, and small articles, and carried the rest of his belongings in his blanket roll, which contained the occasional shelter half. The regulation weight of the Bulgarian soldier's pack is 32 Kg. (70 lbs.)

Shelter Tent

The Bulgarian and Turkish shelter tents were of rectangular pieces of canvas, making about the same size of tent as our old pattern without the triangular

flap which in it formed the rear wall. The shape of this shelter half enabled it to be used in the formation of large tent units as was seen in every Turkish camp. The Turks lost most all of their conical tents in their campaign with the Bulgarians, but there seemed to be a very liberal supply of shelter tents, which they buttoned together to make into tents of larger form. The shelter tent poles of the Turkish equipment was particularly good because they were made of hard wood, with sockets and ferrules of turned brass on either end, so that several poles could be screwed together into quite a length. In this way a tent pole could be made which would support a large area of canvas formed by buttoning together a number of shelter half pieces.

Shelter in the Field

The Bulgarlan soldier in camp had no tentage except the shelter half he carried on his person. The officers had individual cubical tents with pointed roof, with a very light center pole, somewhat longer than the four side poles. In the campaign in Thrace the Turkish army had a great many conical tents for camps, but the Bulgarians got the most of those and they used them very readily after getting possession. The Bulgarians suffered many hardships on the Chatalja line during the hard winter for want of heavy tentage. Many suffered from frost-bite and a number were frozen; many might have perished if they had not been fortunate enough to get so much shelter from the Turks. Later, in the 2d war, after most of the Turkish heavy tentage was expended and many of the soldiers were without shelter tents, they built huts of brush. Even some of the field hospitals made up their shortage of tentage by the construction of brush huts.

Intrenching Tools

The Bulgarians were well supplied with equipment for field intrenching, as each man carried a tool of some class. Every three men carried a shovel, and the fourth carried a short-handled pick, or a hatchet. After the fall of Adrianople, when a great deal of Turkish equipment fell into the hands of the Bulgarians and Servians, the utility of the shovel was so appreciated that each soldier, not equipped with one of these handy little chest and head protectors, added one of them to his outfit on his own initiative.

I was told repeatedly by Bulgarian soldiers that they had employed their shovels as head shelters, in advancing under artillery fire, first at their own instance, and later, by instruction of their officers. The shovel had no special virtue over our own, except that it was sharpened on one edge, and this proved very valuable in making personal shelter, as much of that shelter was formed out of brush. The Servians carried a man's-size long-handled pick, which did not seem to be as much in the way as one might think.

The Turkish intrenching tools were about the same, but I am not sure how they were distributed among the men.

Transport---With Troops

The Bulgarians on a peace or war footing had no transportation to be used, either in field or supply trains, as a part of the equipment of the army. They depended upon carefully prepared plans for improvising their trains, by the employment in the various districts of mobilization, of the peasants' wagons, most of which were bullock carts. The civil administration was employed to assemble this transporta-

tion where it was called for. The bullock carts were divided into columns, and two non-commissioned officers and a few armed men, as guards, were assigned a certain number of carts, and the train was complete. The wagons drawn by horses, as long as the supply lasted, went to the field trains. The peasant owner accompanied his own outfit, and this plan assured good attention to the stock.

The regulations provided, for each battalion, four pack animals for ammunition and one pack animal to carry cooking utensils and the baggage of the officers. I think all regiments usually succeeded in getting a wagon for each company. Horse drawn wagons were small, as were the animals, and they could not possibly carry more than a thousand pounds under favorable conditions. I saw a number of battalions entrain at the time of the demobilization and each company seemed to have one small two-horse wagon.

The Turks had attempted to provide a special field and supply train, and had in service a great many specially constructed wagons of an uniform type. They were all of such size that they could be drawn by two horses, but as they had difficulty in finding the horses, they practically had to adopt the method of the Bulgarians.

Motor Transportation

Automobiles seemed to be essential to the headquarters of the larger commands, which were liberally supplied with them. General Tochef, commanding the 5th Army, had his headquarters at Kustendil, ten miles from the center of the line, which he could approach over a splendid macadamized road. In another direction the headquarters of the 4th Army lay fifteen or twenty miles beyond the reach of a good road and automobiles could not be used for personal transportation.

Motor Trucks

According to the account I obtained from the agent of the Benz Automobile Company in Constantinople, who supplied all the motor transportation, the Turkish army had forty motor trucks in use at the beginning of the war. Fifteen of these were in Adrianople, with large quantities of motor supplies, and the Bulgars took them all. Three sizes of trucks were used; two, three, and five ton. The oldest had been in use for four years aad was still doing duty. They were used only about Constantinople and on occasional short lines of communication where there were good roads. The Bulgars had a few motor trucks besides the fifteen they had captured at Adrianople. They were of very great service in the second war because of the number of good macadamized roads by which they were able to connect their lines on the southern frontier, with the railroad. But it was not possible to employ them in any way except on good roads.

Motor trucks were used to some extent in the transport of wounded from those evacuation hospitals that were connected by macadamized roads with the railroad, but they proved to be somewhat unsuited for this purpose, which is quite contrary to what one might naturally imagine. When I interviewed a number of patients by the roadside without much to account for their presence, they told me they were there because the driver of an automobile truck had answered their prayers to be placed out on the road rather than to be subjected to the pain of further jolting. They had concluded they would fare better by taking their chances of being picked up by the bullock carts than continuing with the more rapid transportation that the motor truck afforded. With all their humility, the bullock carts still have their

advantages. The difficulties they overcame in the Bulgarian advance from Kirk Kilisse might not have been accomplished by more modern forms of transportation. It is very likely that the bullock carts in the present state of development of Bulgarian military resources are quite superior to any other form of transportation for her army.

Fifth Lecture

Some Sanitary Observations

I ARRIVED in Constantinople November 3, 1912, or three days after the formation of the Chatalja lines following the defeat of the Turkish army in the field. About two weeks later the Bulgarian assault on the Chatalja line, which occupied three days, was made and failed. By this successful defense Constantinople was saved. The wounded from the field campaign were still coming to Constantinople at the time of my arrival, and an epidemic of cholera, which had begun its rage in the Turkish troops of the Chatalja lines, was acknowledged about this time in Constantinople. The victims of the disease were arriving in the outskirts of Constantinople at San Stephano at the rate of several hundred a day from the railhead of the defenses at Heydemkui. While the cholera camp that was established at San Stephano had become known to the world as a great pest-hole, and while thousands of sick were at first without shelter and were never well housed, two things must be said in extenuation of the harsh criticisms of the Turkish administration. First, the Ottoman Empire was in great peril and all the resources of transportation and supply were desperately needed and duly impressed in the service of strengthening the defenses of the capital; and, second, such expedients as were employed, though harsh and abrupt, were

efficient in saving Constantinople from a cholera invasion. All trains carrying soldiers from the front, whether sick from any cause, or stragglers or deserters, were impounded together without shelter and treated alike. The sick were not separated from the well and all were sheltered as facilities became available. Later, many cases were taken to the mosques in Constantinople where a careful and efficient guard system kept all the soldiers separate from the civilian population and saved the latter from infection.

From my own experience, in charge of a cholera camp at San Stephano, there were about 600 soldiers under guard in a compound where all were sheltered in permanent buildings, sheds or tents and probably 200 were not infected. Of the remaining 400, all were undoubtedly cholera cases. Though 200 of them died, the death rate diminished from fifty per day to one per day in the first ten days of my service. This diminunition in the death rate was in direct ratio to the progress of rough but substantial sanitary measures. At this time I will not presume to estimate accurately the number of cases of cholera in the Turkish army, and I am sure there can never be any reliable statistical data prepared, but there must have been more than 10,000 deaths. The mortality was about 50 per cent in my cases, but I believe that the rate is relative to the conditions under which the cases are treated. I believe that, with the same virulence of the infecting organism, the same resistance of the patients, and the same conditions of shelter, sanitation and treatment as are generally available in the treatment of typhoid fever, for instance, the mortality of cholera might be no greater than that of typhoid fever. In other words, if cholera were treated with the same care and under the same conditions as typhoid fever is treated to

establish its best mortality statistics, the mortality in cholera—in some epidemics, at least—would not be greater than that in typhoid fever.

My service in Constantinople, in an improvised military hospital, covered a period of six months, with an admission of 500 surgical cases. I was acting there in the capacity of chief surgeon of the local chapter of the American Red Cross Society, which financed our establishment and we assumed complete charge of 120 beds which we found occupied by wounded. This provisional hospital, known as Tash Kishla, the last military hospital to be established, was filled with the sick and wounded last to arrive in Constantinople from the defeated army.

During the activities on the Chatalja line we received some new patients, and later, after hostilities were resumed, following the armistice on February 3, 1913, received some more patients. After that time all our patients were received by transfer from other and better hospitals where more active services were maintained. In fact Tash Kishla became the dumping ground or clearing house of the military hospital system of Constantinople, so that the cases we received in the last months were the class of old infections or convalescents which had lost their surgical interest and were transferred to us from other hospitals to make room for their more interesting cases. It may be observed, in this connection that the Turkish medical service in Constantinople was conducted with the same enterprise and surgical zeal that sometimes characterizes hospital administration in more enlightened countries.

It is naturally incumbent upon a surgeon with any pretention to professional efficiency or scientific accomplishment, when he has completed a service of any kind, to prepare a report in which statistics are compiled with an exactness and precision that ex-

tends into several decimal points, from which he may draw conclusions for the instruction of his colleagues. In the surgery of civil life such processes can only be commended, for they may be of some professional value and can hardly be fraught with any danger. The same may be said of the surgery of war, except that the conclusions drawn from an individual service, however active, may represent an experience confined to some local phase of military activity or administration to which the cause, character and frequency of wounds is peculiar.

I have seen reports of two eminent and distinguished surgeons, with the character of whose respective services I am personally familiar. These reports carry an accurate and interesting account of their special work which no doubt will be of exceedingly great professional value and will find permanent place in medical annals. But I believe that their personal experience or that of any other operating surgeon, in the course of any war, is not sufficient to enable them to draw conclusions that will establish *reliable statistics on the wounds of war* because such can only be prepared from the reports of all phases and conditions of the military activity of all the campaigns of the war. The character and cause of the wounds, admitted to military hospitals must always be carefully considered in relation to the particular form of military activity from which they have resulted. In different actions there must be a variable preponderance of wounds from the different arms by which the wounds were inflicted and the course of these wounds, thus received, must be determined largely by the nature of the campaign and by its successes or reverses, which determine the condition of neglect to which wounds are subjected either at incidence or in subsequent course.

With this preface and caution I will presume to

give a brief numerical statement of my own experience at Tash Kishla hospital. In 317 gun shot wounds there were 32% shrapnel and 68% rifle wounds. In another group of 68 cases in the same hospital, that came under my observation, but without my administration, there were 37% shrapnel wounds and 63% rifle wounds. These ratios, however, apply only to these particular groups of cases, which, from the circumstances of their collection at this particular place, will give a greater proportion of shrapnel wounds than occurred in the particular battle in which they were received, because many of them came to us for the reason that they were old infected cases and infection undoubtedly occurs with a great deal more frequency in shrapnel than in rifle wounds.

In Constantinople there is a Turkish military hospital in Stamboul, known as Gülhani, which is under the direction of the German Professor Weiting Pasha, who has held his position as medical instructor in the Turkish army for 12 years. This hospital enjoyed the advantage of location at the terminus of the line of railways which led into Constantinople, so that hospital trains could be stopped nearby to permit patients to be carried by litter directly into the hospital. The advantage of this location brought to this service, at all the stages of the war, the more seriously wounded cases, which were retained until convalescence was established; when they were transferred to make room for other serious cases. The service here was undoubtedly the most active in the city, with always a greater proportion of seriously wounded cases in the wards. The lighter cases were only admitted when the supply of serious cases had fallen below the capacity of the hospital. So it may be said that while the statistical reports of even this hospital will be of undoubted surgical value, they will not show the relative proportion of the wounds of war in re-

spect to their gravity course and relative frequency of their causation.

I have here a table showing such statistics from almost 1000 cases as Professor Weiting Pasha had prepared at Gülhani Hospital at the time of my departure from Constantinople, but he warned me that his statistics would not show the frequency, character, and result of wounds as they occurred throughout the war.

Wounds of the Extremities

(Exclusive of head, thorax and abdomen)

	Rifle	*Shrapnel*	*Total*
Flesh Wounds	317	129	446
Penetrating	8%	23%	
Perforating	92%	77%	
Aseptic	82%	72%	
Infected	18%	28%	
Deaths	4	2 equals 1.3%	

	Rifle	*Shrapnel*	
Joint Wounds	146	55	102
Aseptic	75%	69%	
Infected	25%	31%	
Deaths	7	5 equals 6%	

	Rifle	*Shrapnel*	
Bone Wounds	254	95	349
Aseptic	68%	29%	
	Rifle	*Shrapnel*	
Infected	32%	71%	
Deaths	16	11 equals 8%	349
TOTAL	117=71%	279=29%	996
Aseptic	76%	58%	
Infected	24%	42%	

Total deaths: 45 or 4.5% caused by sepsis, gas bacillus infection and tetanus.

Typhus was epidemic among the Turkish troops at all times. I visited a hospital on the Chatalja Line

where the cases were segregated, as many of them came from a certain portion of the line which this hospital served. An interesting story with some relation to the means of transmission of typhus was told me there. A medical officer from this hospital went to Constantinople and, in the house of a friend, discarded his underclothing in the process of personal renovation. These garments were appropriated and utilized by his undiscriminating friend who died, after several days from typhus, without other cases occurring in the neighborhood.

At the beginning of the Second War I went to Bulgaria for another season of professional activity. Time will not permit more than a reference to my field service there in the Evacuation Hospital of 700 beds capacity on the Macedonian frontier. All our cases came to us after a four day journey in bull carts. In my first day's service my division, conducted by an English-speaking Bulgarian reserve medical officer and myself, which admitted half of the cases, received nearly 500 wounded which were treated in some sort of a way before they were passed into the wards. In four weeks my division admitted 2,000 patients, all wounded, which was about one half of the total number admitted in that time. I was surprised to note the comparatively few major operations that were indicated in this number of 4,000 cases. There were not more than 20 cases taken to the operating room for anesthaesia and formal preparation. I am inclined to believe that something like this proportion of major operations will hold in a group of cases which include all of the casualties occurring in one military zone. Formal surgical interference should be delayed until a base hospital is reached, where the best skill and facilities are available and where the convalescence of the patient can be established or the autopsy performed. The cases admitted

to hospitals in advanced positions deserve the maximum of surgical judgment with the minimum of surgical activity.

Abdominal cases were of two classes—with and without peritonitis. The first class uniformly succumbed to operation and the second needed no interference. I am confident that the military rule of non-interference in abdominal cases in the field is correct and should be applied. Cranial wounds did not do well after operation, and I believe better results would have followed if the most of them had been sent back to the base without formal operation in the field.

In our cases there seemed to be an unusual proportion of compound fractures of the thigh compared with the humerus. These cases all deserve the most conservative treatment and immediate transportation to the rear. Plaster dressings were used without rhyme or reason. I believe that any medical service in the field will not suffer if plaster of paris be not supplied.

The first aid dressing and its indication you know about. Its employment in the field justified its reputation for keeping clean a great many wounds to which it was applied.

The therapeutic agents most indicated and employed were iodine, benzine, alcohol, balsam of peru and a nascient oxygen preparation, Merck's "Perhydrol" which has three times the strength of the official hydrogen peroxide and is therefore three times as efficient in the same bulk. Iodine has its uses and is the most valuable of all antiseptics in military surgery, but its recent rise to fame had so impressed the Bulgarian surgeons that their gunshot wounds often had a hard run for the terminal stages of convalescence against the persistent and heroic iodine treatment.

Sanitation---Personal

There is little to be said about the personal hygiene of the Bulgarian soldier because he went along with the army just about as he had done in civil life, and the conditions under which his military service was spent were hard and exacting. He had little else to think about other than the mere problem of his existence which he solved in his primitive way. For the Turk, something more may be said because his religious forms prescribe a bath on Thursday, as he goes to the Mosque on Friday for his special weekly devotion, and at any other time that he says his prayers with proper formality he must wash his feet. As a good many prayers are said between the days of formal worship, there is a constant alertness on the part of the Turk to perform this libation. The Moslem's religiously prescribed method of attending to the other necessary demands of nature contributes directly to his personal sanitation.

Camps

I saw all the camps of the army at Chatalja during the second armistice and, at that time, a surprisingly great number of sanitary principles were observed. Sinks were all properly removed from the tents and a guard was placed over them, to enforce the sanitary orders. The penalty for any dereliction was flogging, and I was told that it was not often necessary to administer this punishment. The water supply of these camps, which was very widely distributed, was all posted so as to indicate the quality of the water: whether potable, suitable for animals or washing clothes, or use prohibited. At the base hospital at the center of the line, there was a laboratory where water was examined. One sanitary company had its drinking water kept in the keg in which

it had been transported from its source by pack animals and from which the water was drawn off by a spigot. I saw a picket line that was clean enough for a sanitary inspector in our own army at a maneuver camp. The manure sometimes did not reach the ground before it was carried off by an orderly to the nearby incinerator where fire was said to be constantly burning. Everything was scrupulously clean, as there was absolutely no conscience on the part of the officers in keeping their men at work policing camp when there was no other duty to perform.

Medical Service with Organizations

The Bulgarian medical service with organizations was generally deficient, both in personnel and equipment. There was a regimental medical service, which gave a medical officer to each of the four battalions in a regiment, but in one regiment, I know, the medical service was in the hands of a dentist and two medical students. Bulgaria accepted her sanitary organization rather heroically as it was not possible to bring it up to the more elaborate standard of modern armies, because there was not sufficient medical personnel in the country to permit it. There are only 650 doctors in Bulgaria. Two hundred of these are in the regular military establishment, but all of the others are taken from civil life, conscripts to military service, during the war. There is a system of subordinate medical service in Bulgaria which is something like that of the "practicante" of the Spanish countries. These partly qualified medical attendants were called "Feldchers" in their civil practice, and all of them capable of performing military duty were absorbed in some capacity by the army.

I saw one regimental hospital that seemed quite well enough equipped, in personnel and material, to do fairly good work. It was one mile behind the line

of the regiment to which it belonged, and down in the valley at the foot of the hill on which the regiment was placed. It was close enough to have some of its transportation destroyed by shells. A telephone line connected it with the regimental headquarters on the hill and an operator was kept constantly at the telephone.

Turkish field service organization was superb on paper as it is copied from the German army in almost its entirety. In its application was its shortcomings. It was able to do practically nothing in the first war in the campaign in Thrace, because in this disorganized army medical officers lost their equipment, and the Turkish medical officer has very little resource when he is taken away from his formal relation with his duties.

Field Medical Service

The Bulgarian field medical service was entirely insufficient. There were only nine organizations that were called field hospitals and two large evacuation hospitals in their army organization. When the war began, however, hospitals were organized in some of the larger towns and went into service as military hospitals. On the whole, the medical department did well with what resources they had at hand.

The Turkish field medical service was well organized on paper. They had an abundance of material, but the great disorder attending the retreat of their army prevented its employment and resulted in its loss. I have this information from the sanitary inspector general of the Turkish army.

Evacuation of Battlefields

My late observations in the evacuation of battlefields has not extended from the firing line to the base hospitals. I have only seen the results of the

work performed at the first aid stations, regimental and field hospitals. Cases first came under my notice in an evacuation hospital, twenty miles in a direct line, but forty miles by road behind the battlefield, from which four days were required for their transportation to this hospital. I know something of the manner in which the first stage of this work was performed by the direct testimony of those who did it, and from the inspection of regimental and field hospitals during an armistice. The difficulties under which all this work was carried on in a rough country, with part of it without roads, was very great. The amount of equipment at hand in some instances was very meager, although in other locations it was quite ample. In one army, where the war was one of position, and where material could be gathered in abundance, on account of a railroad terminal within a few miles of the center of the position, the work was carried on without much defect and in some instances in a very satisfactory way. In another army, which was moving constantly in the field, hospital bases were only reached over improvised roads, and the work of caring for the wounded was attended by incomparably greater difficulties. In the latter case the regimental hospitals consisted of little more equipment than could be carried on a sanitary personnel and there was absolutely no shelter except what could be constructed from brush.

Every Bulgarian battalion was supplied a light two-horse wagon, with a very small bed, which would haul one recumbent patient. This vehicle was given up to the sanitary service, to be employed as roads would permit. The field hospitals were some distances from the rear, but their position was determined by the topography of the country which often gave no alternative in location. The trans-

portation facilities for the wounded, while they consisted solely of bullock wagons, were not as bad as one might think, because, in their plodding pace, these lumbering vehicles on rough, impassable roads were much better than any other form of transportation. Their structure is somewhat flexible and whenever the animals feel the resistance of an obstruction their pull becomes more steady and causes smoother riding, no doubt. than traction of any other kind.

In any army in the field, it should be understood that the wounded man can never be cared for as he would be in the hands of friends or under conditions that are provided by the public in civil life. Only a small portion of military resources can be diverted to the care of casualties from the real function of producing military strength. Casualties are bound to occur, at times in greater number than can be cared for with the best sanitary equipment an army can afford. The wounded soldier under the very best conditions is a "poor devil out of luck," and all of those responsible for his care should understand the principles upon which the evacuation of battlefields are based and they must be able to reconcile themselves to the many unhappy conditions that are bound to result. The effort of a sanitary department at the front is directed primarily to a protective dressing and the removal of the casualties and not to their further treatment. Only the rough measures that can be employed to protect the wounded from further accident are possible, and all of the military personnel, both in the combatant department and in the sanitary corps, should have this understanding, so that they may all play their proper and appropriate parts.

Battlefield Casualties

The wounds of the battlefield which do not in

their incidence invade vital spots or destroy enough tissue to cause death, sooner or later, while they may be classed primarily as slight or severe, depend almost entirely in their course and cure upon their *sterility* or *infection.* The gravity of the infection (without considering the resistance of the individual patient) depends upon the character or virulence of the germ which causes the infection by its growth in the wound. Some germs, known as the ordinary germs of suppuration, which may cause large quantities of pus, do not, by their growth in the tissues, produce by-products or excreta, which are particularly poisonous when absorbed. Other germs, however, when they once begin their growth in a wound, produce a poison that is so virulent, or so readily absorbed, that the wound at once becomes grave or fatal.

There are two common classes of virulent infection of battlefield wounds. The first is caused by the group of germs, producing by their growth a gas which is indicated by the gross appearances of swelling, blisters and a crackling sound on pressure over an area near or surrounding the injury. Wounds in which such germs grow are tritely spoken of by surgeons as "gas-bacillus infections." The second is caused by the tetanus bacillus, or the germ of lock-jaw. In wounds of the battlefield these two kinds of infection are always liable to occur, and when they do, the mortality hovers around 100 per cent. These infections occurred in my experiences in the Balkans with about that mortality, but with much less frequency than they are being reported now from the European battlefields. This is to be expected, however, as the fields being fought over in Europe are germ-ladened by a population denser than that of the Balkans.

These germs abound in some localities, and under

military conditions which prevent the best sanitary service and they are liable to be transmitted from one wound to another. So, it follows that in all cases the prevention of infection is the primary object of a sanitary service in the treatment of battlefield wounds.

Rifle Wounds

Rifle wounds are the most frequent of the battlefield and as the modern small calibre, high velocity, rifle projectile generally destroys little tissue, if a vital spot is not invaded a cure may generally be expected if the wound be not infected. This was my observation in Constantinople and Bulgaria. It was particularly so in the wounds of the Turkish army, because the only patients we had in our hospital were those who made their way to the rear unaided, except by their own efforts or by comrades, and their wounds were, necessarily not very grave in their incidence.

Shrapnel Wounds

Shrapnel wounds have been the subject of more general and even professional interest than other battlefield casualties in recent years. There are only three characteristics of shrapnel wounds which give them a separate class: first, multiplicity; second, slight penetration; and third, greater laceration than in rifle wounds, which makes greater susceptibility to infection. The shrapnel ball does not so often penetrate vital structures and under conditions favorable for treatment, is not so fatal as a rifle ball.

There has been much recent and wild speculation on the relative frequency of rifle and shrapnel wounds, sometimes by civil surgeons, who may have seen considerable service in the treatment of wounds of war. But in the great majority of instances their group of cases was selected by the various

incidents and accidents of the distribution of patients from the battlefield to the hospitals and they do not represent all classes and conditions of wounds. As an example, I may mention one of the most distinguished civil surgeons of Europe whom I knew in Constantinople to have the same class of cases that came under my care. His report as a surgeon, on the professional aspects of his cases is beyond question, but his numerically limited experience could hardly qualify him to deduce that the preponderence of shrapnel wounds, in modern wars, has inverted the old ratio of 10% shrapnels to 90% rifle wounds. This gentleman was so impressed with this conclusion that, through his efforts, a resolution was passed by the Imperial Ottoman Medical Society, calling on the civilized nations of the world to agree to discontinue the use of field artillery on account of its capacity for inhumanly murderous destruction of life in battle.

This surgeon, Prof. Depage of the University of Brussels, is now on the personal staff of King Albert with the Belgian army, and with all due respect to his eminent professional attainments, I believe that his statistics when compiled after he finishes his present tragic service, will probably be more valuable because they will be based on a vastly larger experience.

In Kustendil there passed through my hospital most all of the wounds—about 10,000 in number—from one army, and the proportion of shrapnel to rifle wounds was about 20 to 80. This is something of an increase over the ratio of shrapnel to rifle wounds of older statistics, but the nature of the campaign was such that the field artillery employed was greater than the usual proportion engaged in the field of operations of an army.

Shell Wounds

Shell wounds include all degrees of lacerations and destruction of tissues, depending, naturally, upon the proximity of the victim to the exploding shell. Their severity, as a class, is always greater than those resulting from small arms or shrapnel, but their frequency in comparison might well be called rare.

Bayonet Wounds

Bayonet wounds are of interest in a military hospital largely because of their infrequency, but this, in a measure, is due to the fact that a much smaller percentage of these than any other class of battlefield wounds reach the hospital or need the surgeon's care. I saw only a few of them, but in one case I was fortunate enough to be able to do an autopsy as the soldier who died under my care was without a diagnosis. His wound was in the left chest below the arm pit and the laceration suggested a shell fragment or possibly a shrapnel ball as its cause. The autopsy revealed a deep penetration, downward, and the stiring up of viscerae as might be expected from the prying or rotary movement given to the causative weapon.

Traumatic Gangrene

As this opportunity is unfavorable for a review of the entire subject of Military Surgery, I will only mention another surgical condition, namely, the gangrenes incident to military service. The conditions that are due to the graver and more advanced forms of infections, in all classes of wounds, may be passed over, as the type I wish to mention is particularly and peculiarly incident to such military service as I saw in the Turkish army. It may be called "traumatic" or "constrictive" gangrene, as it primarially is due to the constriction of the shoes and

leggings in connection with such injury or traumatism to the feet in hard marching that causes the feet to swell. These cases in the Turkish army, after the first campaign, were quite numerous.

The Turkish peasant normally wears slippers, and when he was given shoes and spiral puttee leggings, he had no experience upon which to form any judgment concerning their use.

After some abuse of the feet from marching in ill-fitting, water-soaked and, perhaps, sand or mud-filled shoes, the feet swelled enough to fill the shoes to the point of constriction which caused some swelling above the shoe and which the wet and illy applied spiral legging further constricted. The result was a partial and then a complete interruption of the circulation, beginning in the skin and tips of toes and then gradually extending toward the knee as the condition persisted. I have the authoritive history of one of my cases who had worn his shoes between three and four weeks while marching in the rain and mud by day and sleeping without shelter at night, because he never could find what he considered a proper or necessary opportunity to take off his shoes, namely, a place indoors. In another case, the soldier said he was kept marching all the time and his officer prevented him from taking off his shoes as he was required to keep himself in readiness to march. His shoes were not removed for more than two weeks. I do not offer these cases as a general indictment of the puttee leggings, which I believe to be all right in its proper use, but only as a most pathetic consequence of its abuse.

These cases presented an interesting surgical phase, because they were generally not infected, and if properly treated, natural processes effected a separation between the dead and living tissue with only a slight assistance from the surgeon. The line

of natural demarkation was invariably very much nearer the extremity than a formal amputation would have made it. Unhappily for a great many of these unfortunate victims, surgical impatience or some other non-commendable attribute was responsible for needless amputations, because the cases were mistaken for the gangrene of the ordinary surgical variety. Some cases were fatally infected by the operation for this condition which most probably would have been spontaneously cured by nature and a little sanitary attention.

Vaso-Motor Gangrene

I saw in Constantinople another type of gangrene which must have resulted indirectly from the contraction of the blood vessels caused by an effect on the brain by concussion from a high explosive. A soldier was rendered unconscious by a "great explosion," as he described it, which hurled him many feet and covered him with much earth and many bruises, but no open wounds. After slowly regaining consciousness, his hands and feet remained numb and gradually became gangrenous, until various portions of the extremities separated and left the unfortunate victim with an odd variety of stumps. One hand was left with only enough digital remnants to give him gripping power sufficient for him to feed himself, and both legs carried short stumps below the knee.

Appendix

Chronological Table of the Principal Events of the Balkan Wars

1912

Oct. 8.—Montenegro declared war.
Oct. 13.—Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian note to Turkey.
Oct. 14.—Montenegrin capture of Touzi.
Oct. 15.—Peace signed between Turkey and Italy.
Oct. 16.—Berane captured by the Montenegrins.
Oct. 17.—Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Servia, who accepted the challenge.
Greece declared war on Turkey.
Oct. 18.—Moustafa Pasha captured by Bulgarians.
Elassona occupied by Greeks.
Oct. 20.—Bulgarian advance on Adrianople.
Oct. 21.—Greek landing in Lemnos.
Oct. 22.—Prishtina captured by Servians.
Oct. 23.—Novi Bazar captured by Servians.
Dedeaghadj captured by Bulgarians.
Heavy fighting at Adrianople.
Oct. 24.—Capture of Kirk Kilisse by Bulgarians.
Capture of Koumanovo by Servians.
Oct. 25.—Bombardment of Adrianople.
Oct. 26.—Capture of Usküb by Servians.
Oct. 27.—Capture of Ishtib by Servians.
Oct. 28.—Capture of Veria by Greeks.
Oct. 29.—Battle in Thrace begun at Bunar Hissar.
Oct. 30.—Capture of Thasos by Greeks.
Oct. 31.—Rout of the Turks at Lule Bourgas by Bulgarians.
Capture of Ipek by Montenegrins.
Capture of Prizrend by Servians.
Nov. 3.—Capture of Preveza by Greeks.
Bombardment of Shkodra by Montenegrins begun
Nov. 4.—Turkish appeal for mediation.
Nov. 5.—Turks retreat on Chatalja.
International squadron comes to Constantinople.
Nov. 9.—Capture of Salonika by Greeks.
Nov. 13.—Negotiations for an armistice.

Nov. 17.—Bombardment of Chatalja begun.
Montenegrins entered San Giovanni di Medua.
Nov. 18.—Fall of Monastir before Servians.
Nov. 20.—Hostilities suspended at Chatalja.
Nov. 21.—"Hamidie" torpedoed by Bulgarian flotilla.
Nov. 22.—Mitylene occupied by the Greeks.
Nov. 24.—Scio occupied by Greeks.
Nov. 25.—Ottoman and Bulgarian plenipotentiares meet at Bakhshaiskeuy.
Nov. 28.—Durazzo occupied by Servians.
Dec. 3.—Armistice signed by Turkey with Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro.
Dec. 16.—Peace Conference met in London.
Dec. 16.—Naval engagement outside Dardenelles.
Dec. 20.—Kortcha captured by Greeks.

1913

Jan. 16.—"Hamidie" sinks Greek transport "Makedonia" in Syra harbor.
Jan. 17.—Collective Note of Powers to Turkey.
Jan. 18.—Naval battle off Tenedos.
Jan. 22.—Ottoman National Assembly declares for peace.
Jan. 23.—Unionist coup d'Etat; Nazim Pasha killed. Mahmoud Shevket Pasha Grand Vizier.
Jan. 30.—Ottoman reply to note of Powers delivered.
Feb. 3.—Armistice ended. Bombardment of Adrianople renewed.
Feb. 10.—Gunboat "Asar-i-Tewfik" stranded in Black Sea.
Feb. 8-10.—Battle of Boulair.
March 6.—Capture of Yanina by Greeks.
March 11.—"Hamidie" sinks Greek transport at S. Giovanni di Medua.
March 15.—Samos occupied by Greeks.
March 18.—King George I of Greece assassinated.
March 22.—Powers send identical note to Allies.
March 23.—Djavid Pasha surrenders to Servians at Skumbi.
March 26.—Capture of Adrianople by Bulgarians and Servians.
April 2.—Funeral of King George of Greece.
April 16.—Cessation of hostilities at Chatalja agreed on.
April 23.—Shkodra captured by Montenegrins.
May 21.—Peace delegates meet in London.
May 30.—Peace preliminaries signed in London, with Turko-Bulgarian frontier established on Enos-Media line.

June 29.—Bulgarians attack Servians in valleys of the Vardar, Bregalnitca and Zletovska.
June 30. Greeks crush Bulgarian battalion at Salonika.
July 15.—Roumanians cross the Danube at Rostchuk.
July 18.—Turks advance from Chatalja lines and occupy Adrianople.
July 30.—Bulgarian Army received orders to supend operations.
July 31.—Armistice for four days beginning at 1:00 p.m.. this day.
Aug 6.—Armistice extended three days from this day.
Aug. 9.—Treaty of Peace signed at Bucharest by Bulgaria, Roumania, Servia, Montenegro and Greece.
Sept. 29.—Treaty of Constantinople established Turko-Bulgarian frontier.

Economic Effect of the Results of the War Upon the Resources of the Ottoman Empire

While this observation may be a little out of sequence, I have the data on such good and reliable authority that they have a positive value in their authenticity, whatever may be their portion of interest. I made the note at the time of conversation with an European in high official position in the Turkish fiscal service. He said that he could speak with confidence because he had very recently compiled a financial statement which contained the figures which he easily remembered. The statement was made in answer to the question: "What effect will the loss of the European Provinces have upon the resources of the Ottoman Empire," and, the answer was that the effect would be much to the Empire's economic advantage, for the following reasons: the annual military expenditures directly chargeable to the support of the army maintained in the "valayet of Adrianople," as the province of Thrace is called in the Turkish administration system, was 1,300,000 pounds Turkish. The annual revenues from all sources was 1,100,000 pounds Turkish, which left an annual deficit of 200,000 pounds Turkish for the province of Thrace alone.

The annual military expenditure for the support of the army maintained in Macedonia had exceeded the total revenues, in the preceding years, from 600,000 to 800,000 pounds Turkish. Of the entire disbursements in the European Provinces, the Ottoman Empire expended one third or more on the military establishment maintained there.

The value of a Turkish pound is about $4.50.

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